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ABSTRACT
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS AT ALL UTILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FACTORS THAT LEAD ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO INVEST IN ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
FEBRUARY 2013
CHRISTOPHER PLETCHER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Henry Renski
While the utilization of energy efficiency has grown in
recent years, it has not been distributed evenly across the
country. In some states, over 2% of a utility’s budget is spent
on energy efficiency; in other states that number is 0.

Much of

the growth in energy efficiency has been due to state policies
and the development utility-level energy efficiency programs.
Yet, all utility programs are not created equal. Because they are
often exempt from state regulation (and therefore state energy
efficiency policy), publicly-owned utilities have traditionally
lagged behind IOUs when it comes to EE programs.
This research quantifies energy efficiency programs in four
Midwestern states: Iowa, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin.

The

first part of the thesis evaluates 474 electric utilities as to
whether they had an energy efficiency program in 2010.

The

second part of the thesis evaluates each utility’s EE program
spending in terms of energy and utility specific factors, as well
as socio-economic, housing stock and political variables.
Through descriptive statistical analysis and the creation of a
v

predictable linear regression model, this thesis identifies
relationships between the dependent variable (EE program spending
as a % of a utility’s total revenue) and commonly cited barriers
to EE program development.
Through the analysis, this study finds widespread EE
program coverage in Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin.

Also, it

finds states are the greatest predictor of utility energy
efficiency program spending.

A utility’s ownership type and the

share of homes that heat with electricity are also significant
predictors of program spending.

Key Words: “Energy Efficiency Programs” “Energy Policy” “Rural
Electric Cooperative” “Municipal Utility” “Investor-owned
Utility” “Energy Efficiency Resource Standard”
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GLOSSARY

Common Program (branded-program) – In some states, a commonly
branded energy efficiency program exists that utilities can
take part in.

Utilities benefit from greater scale and

shared administration costs.

Often these programs are run

by a third-party administrator.
Decoupling – Decoupling is a rate adjustment mechanism that
breaks the connection between how much energy a utility
sells and the revenue it collects.

It helps minimize the

conflict between selling energy for a profit and promoting
energy efficiency.
Demand-Side Management (DSM) - Demand-side management is the
management of energy demand, either through incentivizing
end-user energy efficiency or through peak-load management:
getting end-users to lower the peak energy usage–programs
that run dishwaters and hot water heaters at night when
energy use is low versus the evening when energy use is
high.

While increased energy efficiency reduces overall

energy use, better load management can often reduce the
need for additional electrical generation capacity.

While

both types of demand-side management programs are important
this research focuses on solely energy efficiency.

xii

Energizing Indiana – Common program in Indiana that began in
2011.

IOUs must participate and non-jurisdictional POUs

are allowed to join (and most have).
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) – An EERS is “a
mechanism established by law that encourages more efficient
use of electricity and natural gas by requiring utilities
to save a certain amount of energy either on an annual
basis, on a cumulative basis, or both.

Utilities achieve

these savings by implementing energy efficiency programs to
help their customers save energy in their homes and
businesses.” (Furrey, 2009)
Focus on Energy – Common program in Wisconsin that has been
around since 2005.

IOUs must contribute and participate.

POUs either may either participate or retain their
contribution and operate an independent program.
Generation & Transmission Cooperative – Made-up of rural electric
cooperatives.

G&Ts generate and/or purchase the

electricity distributed and sold by RECs.

In some areas

(Hoosier Energy in Indiana is a good example) a G&T
cooperative has operated a common energy efficiency program
for its REC members.
Integrated-Resource Planning (IRP) – IRP is “a planning and
selection process for new energy resources that evaluates
the full range of alternatives, including new generating
capacity, power purchases, energy conservation and
efficiency, cogeneration and district heating and cooling
xiii

applications, and renewable energy resources, in order to
provide adequate and reliable service to its electric
customers at the lowest system cost.” (Energy Policy Act of
1992)

IRP has helped utilities see energy efficiency (or

demand-side management) as a resource and a useful
alternative to increasing generation capacity in response
to growing demand.
Investor-Owned Utility (IOU) – IOUs are one of the three types of
utilities that distribute electricity or natural gas to
customers.

IOUs are for profit companies regulated by

state public utility commissions. They are often very
large, serving customers across many states.
Load Management – Often a key component of demand-side management
programs, load management refers to managing the way
customers use energy.

Often this involves programs that

get customers to switch some of their energy use from peak
periods to times when energy demand is low. Successful load
management programs can reduce the need for increasing
generation capacity (i.e. new power plants).
Municipal Utility (MU)- MUs are a publicly-owned utility operated
by a municipality.

MUs can be large and serve cities with

hundreds of thousands of customers or can serve small towns
with hundreds of customers.
Public Benefit Funds – Public benefit funds are a mechanism that
utilities can use to recoup costs for energy efficiency
programs.
xiv

Public Utility Commission (PUC) – The PUC is the state body that
regulates utilities.

They are usually responsible for

monitoring EERS.
Publicly-Owned Utility (POU) – POUs include MUs and RECs.
Because POUs are answerable to their customers via boards,
committees and elections, they are often not regulated by
state PUCs.
Rural Electric (Member) Cooperative (REC or REMC) – RECs are
utilities that serve a mainly rural customer base.

They

were created by the federal government to serve areas of
the country that IOUs found uneconomical to serve.

While

some RECs are still heavily made up of farms and other
rural customers, some have seen suburbs grow in their
service areas.

xv

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As energy prices rise and climate change is recognized as a
more pressing and legitimate threat, the interest in energy
efficiency has grown ever more in recent years.
automobiles have become more efficient.

Appliances and

Energy efficient

building practices are becoming more commonplace in design and
construction.

There are even net-zero energy buildings being

constructed, structures that produce as much energy as they use.
Yet, one of the biggest energy drains in this country is our
existing building stock.

For the year 2010, the U.S. Energy

Information Administration estimated that 41% of total energy
consumption was used in buildings.
Thankfully there are a myriad of ways to make this
consumption more efficient.

Technological advances in lighting,

appliances and heating systems, more efficient and green building
practices (including the retrofitting of older buildings to
perform more efficiently), and changing the way we use our
buildings are just a few.

Yet many of these solutions are not

taken advantage of due to a number of market failures.

While

they may be more cost-effective over the course of their use,
efficient appliances, lighting and building products usually have
higher up-front costs and are not always adopted.

Customers

knowingly choose less efficient products because of lower initial
costs.

When it comes to buildings, even more barriers exist that
1

prevent sizable investments in energy efficiency.

Builders have

traditionally not incorporated energy efficiency measures into
construction.

Homeowners can be reluctant to make an investment

when they might sell the home before they reap the benefits. This
can be even more so with businesses where short-term results
usually outweigh long-term ones.

In the case of rental units

(residential, commercial or industrial), there’s the issue of the
split incentive where the landlord owns the building, but the
tenant pays the energy bill.

Landlords do not have an incentive

to lower an energy bill they don’t pay and tenants do not have an
incentive to invest in a property they don’t own.
Because these barriers have prevented the free market from
readily utilizing energy efficiency, leaders at the national,
state and local levels have instituted an assortment of policies
to increase energy efficiency.

Federal efficiency standards for

automobiles have been created.

Local and state building codes

have incorporated energy efficiency to varying degrees.

Public

education campaigns dedicated to conservation come from the
public, private and non-profit sphere.

In many areas of the

country the policy toolbox now includes an array of incentives,
rebates, loans and other services packaged together in utilitysponsored energy efficiency programs.
Beginning in the late 1970s with rising oil costs, the
breadth of energy efficiency programs expanded rapidly with the
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act which

2

required large utilities to institute energy efficiency and
conservation programs (EIA 2000).

As energy prices decreased in

the 1980s interest in energy efficiency waned and many programs
were allowed to retire (Walker 1985).

In the last decade though,

existing programs have grown exponentially and new programs are
being created each year.

Currently there are robust programs of

all shades and sizes being run throughout United States.
Yet it is difficult to quantify the extent of energy
efficiency program adaption, as well as compare the relative
strength and size of various programs.

The National Rural

Electric Cooperative Association claims that 96% of co-ops have
efficiency programs, 70% offer financial incentives to promote
greater efficiency, and 73% of co-ops plan to expand their
programs in the coming years.

Yet what constitutes an energy

efficiency program is not defined.

Twenty-six percent of co-ops

offer a program, but no financial benefits.

Do they offer

financing, market-rate services, or do they simply send a How to
Save Energy educational booklet with the annual report each year?
The literature that has reviewed energy efficiency programs
suggests a dearth of programs at rural electric cooperatives.

Is

the 96% in program coverage cited by the NRECA a very recent
phenomenon?

Or is a trade association like NRECA more generous

in its definition of an energy efficiency program than the
academic community?

3

Usually, the impetus for utilities to conduct an energy
efficiency program is a state mandate.

Of the three types of

utilities, often only investor-owned utilities (IOUs) can be
regulated by state officials.

Rural electric cooperatives (RECs)

and municipal utilities (MUs), collectively known as publiclyowned utilities (POUs), are usually beyond the grasp of
regulation since they are already answerable to the communities
they serve via committees, boards and elections.

A review of the

literature on energy efficiency programs suggests that generally
POUs, have not adopted energy efficiency programs to the same
degree that IOUs have.

Many attribute this to the exception

given to POUs in many states’ energy efficiency mandates.
Yet, some of the oldest and best programs in the country
are at POUs.

Considering the relationship that POUs have to

their customers (be they members of the REC or citizens of the
city operating the MU), it makes sense that a POU should be able
to design and operate a program that better fits the specific
needs of its customers.

The localized nature of RECs and MUs

stands in stark contrast to many IOUs, which tend to be larger,
with service areas that span multiple states and regions of the
country.

If a POU is able to overcome their distinct barriers to

energy efficiency program adoption, their potential for operating
a successful program should be greater because of the special
relationship they have with their customers.

4

This thesis is an attempt to better understand the extent
of energy efficiency program coverage across four Midwestern
states with a rich variety of utility size and ownership
structure.

Beyond simply answering the question: What percent of

utilities have an energy efficiency program, this thesis includes
an examination of how utility-level factors such as energy
consumption rates, utility size, electric rates, type of customer
base, and ownership structure predict how much a utility is
willing to invest in energy efficiency.

Socio-demographic and

economic factors in utilities’ service areas may also predict a
utility’s rate of energy efficiency investment, and those
relationships are also explored in this thesis.
Because of the influence of state-level policies on utility
programs, studies have often compared energy efficiency
adaptation and funding at the state-level.

Those few studies

that have explored utility-level programs and how factors like
ownership structure and size influence them, have rarely done so
quantitatively.

This research assesses energy efficiency program

adaption at all electric utilities in Iowa, Indiana, Michigan and
Wisconsin.

Utilities are compared based on total program

spending as a percentage of total revenue for the year 2010.
Factors such as state policy and history, ownership structure,
energy use, and housing stock are evaluated in order to see how
they might predict spending on energy efficiency. As part of this
analysis, a regression model is built to explore relationships
between these factors and energy efficiency spending.
5

In its broadest sense, the goal of this research is to
increase the utilization of energy efficiency.

While utility

programs have been essential in driving the growth of energy
efficiency, it is imperative that all utilities, regardless of
size, ownership type, geography, or regulation, strongly pursue
energy efficiency.

It has been regularly claimed (Wilson, 2008;

Fischlein, 2009; Frieschlag, 2011, Smith, 2010) that publiclyowned utilities lag behind IOUs when it comes to investing in
energy efficiency.

I plan to more definitively address that

claim, as well as identify which factors are significant barriers
to energy efficiency program development.

By doing so, I will

show what type of utilities are lagging behind and what are the
factors most significantly driving that deficit.

These findings

will be helpful to policymakers, program managers, and others
interested in energy policy.

6

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Introduction
Most of the DSM [demand-side management, aka energy
efficiency] literature dates to the late 1980s and early
1990s… Much of the literature has focused on implementing
DSM in investor-owned utilities or large municipal
utilities.

However, analyses of DSM programs have often

ignored the unique plight of consumer-owned utilities.
These organizations…have different institutional
structures, and face different challenges and opportunities
in implementing DSM programs than IOUs. (Wilson, 2008)
Academic literature on the energy efficiency programs and
policies of rural electric cooperatives (REC) and municipal
utilities (MU) is not extensive.

An initial search turned up

only a handful of articles that specifically looked at energy
efficiency within RECs and Mus.

Many articles deal more

generally with energy efficiency, not differentiating between
investor-owned utilities and publicly-owned utilities.

Articles

that deal more generally with demand-side management (DSM),
specifically load management, are more prevalent.
Although energy efficiency programs are usually managed at
the utility level, many studies (Doris, 2011; Furrey, 2009;
Nadal, 2010; Sciortino, 2011; York, 2005; Foster, 2012; Eldridge,
7

2007 & 2008) evaluate energy efficiency utilization on a state by
state basis.

These studies emphasize the often controlling

factor of state policy and rarely evaluate programs at the
utility level.

Yet they are a helpful resource in assessing

state policy.
In addition to articles generally about DSM programs, there
is also a growing literature that explores energy use more
broadly.

Some articles (Tierney, 2011) explore renewable energy

and the growth of its use by both utilities in general, and RECs
and MUs in particular.

While renewable energy programs may be

similar to energy efficiency programs in some respects,
differences in utilization and cost-effectiveness make
comparisons across the programs problematic.

More useful are

articles (Greer, 2003, 2008) that explore the organization and
structure of different utility types and how they have changed
over the years.

As much of the literature suggests, it is often

these factors that bolster or limit particular programs.

2.2

Energy Efficiency at Publicly-owned Utilities
As stated above, research into how RECs and MUs have

pursued energy efficiency is limited.

One of the stronger

studies (Wilson, 2008) analyzes all the RECs and small MUs across
Minnesota.

It provides a, “background on rural co-operatives and

municipal utilities in the context of the US electric sector and
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highlights[s] the challenges and opportunities of implementing
DSM programs at these institutions.”

It is a break from much of

the energy efficiency program literature because it looks at the
question of ownership model in each utility and how that
influences program adaption.

The study takes a mixed research

approach in examining program adaption at POUs across Minnesota.
Through direct surveying of POUs, the researchers came to a
few key findings:


DSM programs improve customer relations and the utility’s
public image



Developing strong local partnerships are a key ingredient
to success



Organizational capacity to create and manage programs was a
strong limiting factor (especially within very small
utilities)



Common market barriers to energy efficiency were identified
in rural areas and small towns (lower incomes, access to
energy efficiency products and specialty contractors, heavy
residential electrical load)



MUs tend to be smaller, have a smaller residential load,
and have less experience than RECs in delivering DSM
programs



RECs have tended to focus more on load management programs
than MUs.

9

Another article by the same research team, (Fischlein,
2009) approaches the lack of energy efficiency at POUs through
the prism of climate change and emission reductions.

While the

paper doesn’t evaluate a set of utilities for program adaption it
does address POUs specifically.

It notes the lack of research

and data on POUs, that the, “majority of research either
implicitly or explicitly focuses on IOUs.”

It cites a 2005 study

that found program adaption at MUs and RECs at 11% and 21%
respectively.

Yet, it also acknowledges that industry sources at

the time suggest program adaption levels over 50%.

The

researchers attribute much of lack of program adaption at POUs to
a lack of regulatory authority, claiming that POUs largely govern
themselves outside of state purview.
Meyer (1983, explores the history of utility regulation and
comes to a similar, though more general, conclusion regarding the
lack of regulation at POUs.

He challenges the claim that MUs can

better serve their customers when free from state or federal
regulation, arguing that self-regulation encourages inefficient
operation of services.
Surveys and case studies of existing programs are also
important.

One good case study, which explicitly explores

successful energy efficiency programs instituted by RECs, begins
with a short history of DSM programs at RECs beginning in the
1970s and continuing into today (Frieschlag 2011).

Frieschlag

finds that RECs do not invest in energy efficiency to the scale

10

that IOUs do, “many of these nonprofit organizations simply lack
the member and management commitment necessary to deliver high
performance energy saving programs.”

More specifically the study

identifies a number of barriers experienced by RECs: lack of
integrated resource planning, the demographics of RECs’ rural
service areas which demand specifically tailored programs and the
lack of contractor infrastructure need to deliver energy
efficiency effectively.

Frieschlag (2011) also attributes a lack

of member interest in energy efficiency as a contributing factor.
While one of the consensuses of the literature seems to be
that RECs with the strongest programs tend to those that are
subject to state energy efficiency mandates, Frieschlag (2011)
does provide a case study of an exception: Hoosier Energy.
Hoosier Energy is a generating and transmission cooperative
serving 18 RECs in southern Indiana which began operating DSM
programs for its RECs in 2009.

While an EERS had already been

passed by the Indiana legislature, it was not set to begin until
2010 and only applied to jurisdictional utilities (of which
Hooiser Energy’s co-ops are not).

So in many ways Hoosier

Energy’s energy efficiency program was voluntary.

In fact

Frieschlag (2011) attributes the program’s creation to expected
electricity demand growth through 2028 and never mentions the
state’s EERS.

11

2.3

State-level Policy and Energy Efficiency
Because of the market failures that have hampered the

energy efficiency industry throughout the decades, federal, state
and local policies have been extremely important in increasing
the use of energy efficiency.

While in the past building codes,

land-use regulations and state incentives and/or rebates have
proliferated, the recent development of state Energy Efficiency
Resource Standards (EERS) has greatly expanded energy efficiency.
A good introduction to policy options is (Nadal, 2010).

It

outlines three major policy strategies that states currently use
to advance utility DSM.

These include: integrated resource

planning, public benefit funds, and energy efficiency resource
standards.

The paper also defines two complimentary policies

that have assisted the spread of DSM: decoupling and regulatory
incentives.
Furrey (2009) defines EERS as, “a mechanism established by
law that encourages more efficient use of electricity and natural
gas by requiring utilities to save a certain amount of energy
either on an annual basis, on a cumulative basis, or both.
Utilities achieve these savings by implementing energy efficiency
programs to help their customers save energy in their homes and
businesses.”
Because of the accessibility of data at the state-level and
the strong influence of state policy, comparisons are often done

12

at the state-level.

In an evaluation of energy efficiency

program spending, (Nadal 2010) separates all states into 5
different levels.

It finds higher spending levels in the

Northeast, Upper Midwest, and the West (Figure 2.1).

The article

also identifies states with a longer history of energy efficiency
programs.

Those states with significant energy efficiency

programs before 2007 tend to match those with higher spending
levels and are concentrated in the same areas of the country.
Figure 2.1: Spending on Electric Utility Energy Efficiency Programs as
a Percent of Utility Revenues (2009)

Source: ACEEE analysis using data from CEE and EIA2 (Nadal 2010)

Another state-level analysis, (Sciortino 2011), shows an
increasing adoption of EERS.

While there were only seven states

with an EERS before 2008, twenty-six states now have them in
place.

This report looks at the twenty states that have had an
13

EERS in place for at least two years and sees how energy savings
results match up to goals.

It finds that generally states are

finding success with EERS: over half of the states have exceeded
their energy savings goals and only three states are short of
their goals by more than 20%.

It also finds that states are

finding success irrespective of geography or the state’s
experience with energy efficiency programs in the past.

The

issues that do influence program success are, “the clarity and
appropriateness of the regulatory framework, the length of time
allowed for program administrators to ramp-up programs, and the
overall commitment of all parties to invest the proper resources
to meet targets.” (Sciortino 14)
A broad look at state-level energy efficiency policy is the
annual ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard.

Begun in 2007,

this report ranks all 50 states and the District of Columbia
based on six energy efficiency policy areas: 1) utility and
public benefits programs and policies; 2) transportation
policies; 3) building energy codes; 4) combined heat and power;
5) state government initiatives; and 6) appliance efficiency
standards.

With six annual reports released, the scorecard has

become a reliable way to measure the relative strength of state
energy efficiency policy over the years.
A recent report from the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, (Doris 2011), presents a regression analysis that
explores how state-level policy might influence energy use.

14

With

per capita residential energy use as the dependent variable,
their analysis found EERS, high efficiency building codes and
electricity rates to be significant and have negative
relationships with energy use.
found significant.

Incentives and rebates were not

In their commercial energy use analysis:

rates, EERS, efficient building codes, and personal tax
incentives were all found to be significant and have a negative
relationship.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND DATASET
3.1

Research Questions
This research was driven by a desire to figure out why POUs

haven’t established energy efficiency programs to a similar
extent as IOUs and to figure out how best to correct that.

Yet,

because utility-level research has been sparse (especially
quantitative research), it became necessary to evaluate a
population of utilities in order to see where IOUs and POUs
actually stood in terms of program adaption and operation.
Therefore, this study first addresses the question:
1. Compared to investor-owned utilities, do publicly-owned
utilities operate energy efficiency programs, and how
does their program spending levels compare to IOUs?
With that questioned addressed, the second part of my
thesis goes into more depth, utilizing descriptive statistics and
regression analysis to find relationships between energy
efficiency program spending and factors distinct to each utility.
The second question this study addresses is:
2. What are the factors that influence energy efficiency
program adaption and operation?

What is the relative

influence of state policy, utility ownership type, energy
use, housing stock and other factors specific to a
utility and its service area?
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3.2

Hypothesis
After reviewing the literature on energy efficiency

programs, especially those focusing on POUs, I hypothesize that
POUs have not pursued energy efficiency in great numbers because
they are usually exempt from state energy efficiency mandates.
Once excluded from state minimum standards I expect POUs are less
driven internally to pursue energy efficiency because of common
barriers cited throughout the literature:
o

Tend to be smaller

o

Tend to be poorer

o

Are usually more rural and isolated

o

Customer base are usually heavily residential

o

Often have little or no demand growth

o

Have relatively low rates

o

Lack the political and popular will within the POU for
energy efficiency

o

Independent culture of management and customer base

While I expect there to be an assortment of programs at
RECs and MUs, I expect that most POUs have not operated an energy
efficiency program.

I also expect to find relationships between

many of the common barriers listed above and the total program
spending.
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3.3

Methodology
The analysis of the data takes a two-step process.

First,

the data is explored through descriptive statistics: comparison
of means, medians, quartiles, standard deviations.

I divide up

the data by state and analyze program spending as a percent of
total revenue, the dependent variable.

Then the same process is

done to the data based on ownership type.

Lastly descriptive

statistics for the dependent variable are evaluated in terms of
both ownership types and states.
Data for the dependent variable, energy efficiency program
spending as a percentage of total revenue, is then divided into
four groups: no programs and three tiers: the upper third of
program spending, the middle third and the lower third.

Means

are taken for each tier for every independent variable evaluated
and cross-tabulated.

This is done for the overall dataset as

well as for a data-subset of only POUs and then data-subsets of
each state’s POUs.

This is done to uncover potential

relationships between independent variables and the dependent
variables overall and those specific to POUs in certain states.
The second step of the process is a linear regression
analysis.

Based on a literature review and preliminary data

analysis, I create a model (Model 1) with five independent
variables, plus three state dummy variables.

I evaluate a second

model (Model 2), which has the same variables as Model 1 plus
ownership type dummy variables.

These two models are regressed
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within the overall dataset and the POU data-subset.

Then I

subtract the state dummy variables from Models 1 and 2 to create
Models 3 and 4 which are applied to the state/POU data-subsets.
Changes in variable significance, coefficient strength and sign
throughout the regressions were observed and interpreted.

3.4

Data Selection
The sheer number of utilities in the United States (over

3,200) and the lack of consistent reporting precludes this paper
from a quantitative exploration of energy efficiency programs at
all utilities in all 50 states.

While all utilities are required

to submit data to the federal Energy Information Administration,
most do not include energy efficiency data in their submission.
Using energy efficiency program data from the EIA-861 dataset
would result in a sample that probably skews toward large
utilities and those which are already required by regulation to
operate a program and report on the results.

Since this study

seeks to gain a better understanding of program activity at small
and unregulated utilities, this sample would not suffice.
Instead, this research evaluates all utilities in four
states.

Providing an in-depth analysis of a relatively small

number of states allows me to capture utilities that do not
operate programs and those that operate very small programs.

The

four states chosen: Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin and Michigan, were
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selected because of the variety they represent in regulation,
program management structure, history and program funding (see
Figure 2.1).

Within each state, their variety in utility

ownership model and size, demographics, and political persuasion
was valued.

As roughly proximate, the four states should be

similar in climate, culture and history, important controls.
While other nearby states were considered for the research as
well (Minnesota and Illinois especially), actual energy
efficiency program spending data for the calendar year 2010
proved most accessible in the four states chosen.

3.5

State Background Energy Information
While all four states are similar in size, population,

geography, climate and culture, it is helpful to note the
differences in energy use.

3.5.1 Electrical Generation and Use
This is especially true when it comes to analyzing energy
efficiency programs operated by electric utilities.

The type of

fuel a state uses to power its grid and whether that fuel is
resourced locally or imported both help set the landscape on
which energy efficiency thrives or is under-utilized.
background data comes from the EIA state profiles.
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All state

Iowa – Iowa ranks 5th in the nation for highest per capita
energy use.

This is probably most due to the state’s large rural

and agricultural population and large industrial base.

In 2010,

about 72% of electrical generation in Iowa came from coal, 14%
from renewables, 9% nuclear, and 5% natural gas.

Different than

most states, nearly all of Iowa’s renewable energy does not come
from hydro-electric facilities; with almost 20% of Iowa’s total
electricity coming from wind in 2011.

It also has a relatively

high consumption of liquefied petroleum gases (LPG, also known as
propane) and is the nation’s largest producer of ethanol (which
also might help explain the state’s high per capita energy use).
Indiana – Indiana ranks 10th in the nation in terms of
highest per capita energy use.

While Indiana also has a sizable

rural population, it has more urban and suburban areas than Iowa
(20% of electricity goes to residential use compared to 16% for
Iowa).

Its high energy use might better reflect the state’s lack

of investment in energy efficiency rather than other geographic
or economic factors.

Considering the state is one of the

nation’s leaders in coal production, Indiana generates most of
their electricity from coal, upwards of 87% in 2010.

Twelve

percent was from natural gas and only 1% came from non-hydro
renewables, although the largest geothermal heating and cooling
system in the United States is being built in Muncie.
also a major producer of ethanol.
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Indiana is

Michigan – Michigan is ranked 35th in highest per capita
energy use.

This is probably due both to the large urban areas

in Michigan and to the state’s relatively lower industrial share
of energy use (only 25% compared to 49% in Iowa and 45% in
Indiana).

The state also has a high utilization of natural gas

resources, both because of the large reserves and storage
capacity in the state.

Still, in 2010, Michigan generated 57% of

its electricity from coal, 23% from nuclear, 18% from natural
gas, and 3% from non-hydroelectric renewables (primarily
biomass).
Wisconsin – Wisconsin is ranked 26th in highest per capita
energy use.

The state is very similar to Michigan; its larger

share of industrial use (32% to 25%) help account for the higher
per capita energy use.

Also similar to Michigan, Wisconsin

generated 57% of its electricity from coal, 19% from nuclear, 17%
from natural gas, 4% from non-hydro renewables and 3% from hydroelectric facilities.

Wisconsin is also a major producer of

ethanol.

3.5.2 Home Heating Fuels
The variety of home heating fuels that a state’s households
use is also important to a state’s energy use portfolio.
Generally in the United States, natural gas is the most common
heating fuel, supplying 50% to 60% of the population for the past
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50 years.

Since it is delivered by a pipeline infrastructure,

generally the more rural an area is, the less likely it has
access to natural gas.

Because of the price, efficiency and ease

of delivery, natural gas is usually the first option when
available.

Wherever natural gas isn’t available, consumers must

choose between electricity, LPG, oil or wood.

Electricity tends

to have higher shares of use where heating loads are lighter (the
Southeast, Southwest, and Pacific Northwest).

Historically,

electricity use for heating has been a severely inefficient way
to heat a home (especially in cold climates) and early energy
efficiency programs often targeted those homes for efficiency
measures.

It should be noted though that recent advances in heat

pump technology and greater adoption of weatherization strategies
have allowed for more efficient electric heating.
In the Mountain West, Plain States, and Midwest, propane is
used when natural gas isn’t available and electricity hasn’t been
used.

In the Northeast, oil is the fuel of choice when natural

gas isn’t available.

In some Northeastern states over half the

homes are heated with oil.

Not only does this lead to volatile

heating costs as the price of oil changes, but as the price has
gone up, the Northeast’s reliance on oil heat has become a
liability.

Wood is the other fuel that is used substantially

across the United States.

While many use wood as a supplemental

fuel source, there are many states where a sizable population
uses it as its main heat source.
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Those states (ID, ME, MT, NH,

NM, OR, VT – all over 6%) tend to have a sizable rural
population, extensive forests and lack major metropolitan areas.
Table 3.1: Home Heating Fuel Shares - 2010

Home Heating
Fuel
Natural Gas
LPG (Propane)
Electricity
Oil
Wood

Iowa
65.8%
13.8%
16.2%
1.1%
1.6%

Indiana
63.0%
7.9%
24.9%
1.4%
1.9%

Michigan
78.0%
9.2%
7.0%
2.0%
2.8%

Wisconsin
66.1%
11.0%
13.0%
4.4%
4.3%

Source: U.S. Census 2010 5-year ACS data

The four states in this research are similar in heating
fuel variety and are good examples of the variety in the Midwest
(Table 3.1).

There are some peculiarities to note though.

Probably because of its more southern position geographically,
Indiana has a higher proportion of electricity use for heat.

All

show similar natural gas use except for Michigan which is much
higher.

This is maybe due to a substantial gas reserve in

Michigan and one of largest natural gas storage capacities of any
state in the country.

Wisconsin, with more acres of forest than

either Indiana or Iowa, shows a higher wood use, while Iowa has
slightly more LPG use.

3.5.3 State Energy Efficiency Policies
A state’s energy efficiency policy often has the greatest
influence on energy efficiency program spending.
present energy policy can have an effect.
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Both past and

While all four states

examined currently have energy efficiency resource standards,
their timelines of implementation, savings target levels, and
jurisdiction varies (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Energy Efficiency Resource Standards

State

Savings Target

Standard applies to…

Ind.
–
EERS
Enact
ed
2009

Entire
Industry –
0.3% annual
savings in
2010,
increasing to
1.1% in 2014,
and leveling
at 2% in 2019

All jurisdictional utilities
submit 3-year DSM plans –
which includes all IOUs and
any POUs who have not opted
out of jurisdiction

Iowa
EERS
Enact
ed
2009

Individual
Utilities –
Varies by
utility from
1% to 1.5%
annually by
2013

POUs must
implement
EE
programs,
but POUs
are free to
set their
own targets

Mich.
–
EERS
Enact
ed
2008

Entire
Industry –
0.3% annual
savings in
2009, ramping
up to 1% in
2012 and
thereafter
Entire
Industry –
0.75% in 2011,
2012 and 2013

IOUs, who must submit 3-year
plans; MUs and RECs are
required to implement energy
efficiency programs, set
energy savings goals, create
plans to achieve those
goals, and report to the IUB
on progress, although saving
target standards do not
apply.
All utilities, saving
targets are split between
IOUs and POUs based on their
respective shares of sales;
for all utilities a spending
cap exists.
All utilities who
participate in Focus on
Energy (FOE) – only IOUs are
required to participate,
contributing at least 1.2%
of their gross revenue; POUs
must either contribute about
0.4% or retain their
contribution and operate a
Commitment to Community
(CTC) program.

EERS was
not in
effect
until 2011,
all POU
programs
voluntary
or in
preparation
for 2011
standard

Wisc.
–
EERS
Enact
ed
2010

Status of
POUs in
2010
All EE
programs
voluntary

Energy
saving
standards
and
spending
cap applies
to all POUs

Source: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Policy Database, State PUC
Reports
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Of the four states, only Michigan’s EERS does not make a
distinction between POUs and IOUs.

Indiana’s EERS applies to all

POUs that have not opted out of jurisdiction (which means POUs
are only regulated in Indiana as long as they’d like to be).
Iowa’s EERS requires POUs to implement programs, set energy
saving goals, create plans to achieve those goals, and report to
the Iowa Utilities Board on their progress.

Yet the minimum

energy savings targets set out in the EERS do not apply to POUs.
Iowa’s POUs are allowed to set their own goals, however minimal
they’d like them to be.

Wisconsin’s EERS applies to the state-

branded program Focus on Energy (FOE) of which only IOUs are
required to contribute and participate.

POUs in Wisconsin either

can contribute to FOE (about 1/3 of what IOUs contribute) or
retain their contribution and operate an independent Commitment
to Community program in their own service area – which they are
then required to report on.
The historical legacy of energy policy in these states is
also important.

During the 1980s, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin

all had energy efficiency programs operating in their states.
Yet much of that changed in the 1990s.

According to ACEEE’s

State Energy Efficiency Policy Database, “Michigan had a history
of fairly aggressive energy efficiency programs until 1995, when
demand-side management and integrated resource planning were
discontinued during the move toward electric restructuring.
Michigan had essentially no utility-sector energy efficiency
programs from 1996 until 2008.”

While Wisconsin’s and Iowa’s
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programs did not disappear, they did not see increasing
utilization until the last decade culminating in the passage of
EERS.

Indiana historically has not had any significant energy

efficiency programs.
This historical legacy is evident in the first annual ACEEE
State Energy Efficiency Scorecard created in 2007 (Figure 3.1).
In it both Wisconsin and Iowa rank in the low teens, while
Michigan and Indiana rank 33 and 41 respectively.

By the 2012

Scorecard, after the reimplementation of energy efficiency
programs in Michigan, the state had jumped up to 12th right behind
Iowa.

Indiana still lags quite far behind.

While Michigan’s and

Indiana’s EERS were passed within one year of each other and have
similar energy saving goals, Michigan has had much better
results.

While Indiana was still designing their system,

Michigan’s was in full swing.
Considering it takes acts of legislature to enact EERS,
it’s curious how politics have influenced the operation of EERS.
While their EERS sets an energy saving minimum, the Michigan
legislature decided to also cap the amount of money that
utilities can spend on their energy efficiency programs.
“Spending for each utility is limited to 0.75% of total sales
revenues in 2009, 1.0% in 2010, 1.5% in 2011, and 2.0% in 2012
and each year thereafter.” (ACEEE State Policy Database)

In

Wisconsin following the 2010 conservative victories in state
elections, the legislature capped energy efficiency spending so
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severely that the minimum savings standards in the EERS had to be
lowered.

Spending caps are a somewhat odd addition to energy

efficiency programs considering that the programs tend to only
fund cost-effective measures in the first place.
Figure 3.1: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard

ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard Ranking the 50 States
2007
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Source: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecards 2006-2012

3.6

Dataset
The dataset represents all the 474 electric utilities

operating in the states of Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and
Wisconsin.

When appropriate, utilities headquartered outside of

these states that serve customers in these four states were
included.

Utilities that serve customers in more than one of the
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states examined are separated by their state designation and
considered separate utilities (which is how they operate in
respect to state regulatory bodies).
One of the reasons that Midwestern states were chosen for
this research is the rich variety of utility ownership structure,
geography, and size.

They are either an investor-owned utility

(IOU) or a publicly-owned utility (POU).

Within POUs they are

either a rural electric cooperative (REC) or a municipal utility
(MU).
Table 3.3: Shares of Utilities, Sales and Customers by Ownership Type

All
N=474
IOUs
REC
MU
Small MU
Large MU

# of
Utilities
28
116
330
292
38

Share of
Sales (mWhs)
82%
9%
9%
41%
59%

Share of
Customers
81%
11%
8%
45%
55%

Average # of
Customers
356,538
11,478
3,179
1,614
15,204

Source: EIA-861 (2010)

While IOUs only account for 6% of the 474 utilities, they
are responsible for 82% of electric sales and serve 81% of the
customers (Table 3.3).

Both RECs and MUs (especially small MUs)

are much smaller in size and tend to serve more rural areas.
IOUs serve all types of customers: urban, suburban, and rural; in
more populated areas their service areas tend to be contiguous,
occasionally broken up by a MU.

In suburban areas there tends to

be some overlap between RECs and IOUs, with more MUs mixed in.
In the heavily rural areas, IOU territory snakes along major
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roads with RECs serving the customers along smaller roads.

Small

towns and villages are served by a mix of IOUs, MUs, and RECs.
The utility mix in each state varies as well.

Iowa is

characterized by a large number of small MUs (28% of the entire
dataset consists of small MUs in Iowa).

MUs and RECs in Iowa

have a larger market share than POUs in the other states, about
28%, split evenly between RECs and MUs.

RECs in Iowa are

concentrated in the most rural pockets of the state, generally
not serving even small towns or villages.

They appear to not

have experienced much suburban encroachment.
Indiana’s RECs however have found themselves serving many
suburban customers.

While RECs do not serve traditional town and

village centers in Indiana, many subdivisions have popped up in
their territory.

Of the four states Indiana has the largest

share of customers served by RECs (17%).
Like Indiana, Michigan’s RECs appear to have a more
suburban look than other states.

Michigan is also characterized

by having many fewer utilities than other states, only 58 (Table
3.4).

This is especially true with small MUs and RECs.

While

they do have many fewer small MUs, Michigan is tied with Indiana
for having the most amount of large MUs including 3 of the top 8.
Wisconsin has the most IOUs of any of the states, including
a number of small regional IOUs.

RECs tend to be concentrated in

the central, northern and western parts of the state.
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While RECs

in Wisconsin don’t seem to have experienced the suburban
encroachment that Indiana’s or Michigan’s RECs have, they tend to
include more towns and village centers than the other states.
Table 3.4: Ownership Type by State

Iowa
Indiana
Michigan
Wisconsin
Total

IOUs
3
5
8
12
28

RECs
41
41
10
24
116

Small MUs
133
60
28
71
292

Large MUs
3
12
12
11
38

Total
180
118
58
118
474

Source: EIA-861 (2010)

3.6.1 Dependent Variable
Through this research, I explore factors that help predict
the volume of community investment in energy efficiency through
programs operated at their electric utility.

Energy Efficiency

Resource Standards are either set as minimum energy saving as a
percent of total sales or as minimum program expenditures as a
percent of total revenue.

Because I am interested in utilities

and their commitment to energy efficiency, I choose to focus on
program funding rather than energy savings, which are more a
measure of program design and efficiency.

The dependent variable

in this research is a utility’s energy efficiency program
spending as a percentage of their total revenue.
Total energy efficiency program expenditures for the
calendar year 2010 were collected from a combination of each
state’s public utility commission and/or the utilities
themselves.

These data include residential, commercial,
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industrial, and agricultural programs.

Although efforts were

made to gather as uniform data as possible, each state has
different minimum standards and reporting procedures.

What a

utility in Wisconsin might report as part of their energy
efficiency program, a utility in Iowa might consider as part of
their general service and not energy efficiency.

As a rule, load

management and general education programs were excluded.

On some

occasions utilities submitted their energy efficiency program
spending combined with their load management or renewable energy
program spending.

On those occasions the utility was contacted

and an energy efficiency program spending total was clarified.

3.6.2 Independent Variables
My independent variables fall into four categories:
energy/utility, socio-economic, housing stock, and political.
Energy and utility data come from the Energy Information Agency
(EIA-861).

Two of the most critical energy/utility variables

that may explain variations in energy efficiency program
investment are electric rates and electric energy use.

Because

rates often vary within a utility based on customer class and
volume, the rate variable is calculated by dividing a utility’s
total revenue ($) by their total sales (kWh).

I believe that

rates will have a positive relationship with the dependent
variable.

It’s logical to think that where the price of
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electricity is higher, the demand for energy efficiency will be
greater.
Electric energy use is calculated by dividing residential
sales (kWh) by residential customers.

Residential sales and

customers are used to generate a proxy for normalized energy use
rather than total sales and customers because when commercial and
industrial customers are included, the energy use data is heavily
influenced by the customer class mix (per customer industrial use
is much higher than per customer residential use) and communities
with energy-intensive industries will have high averages for
energy use.

This variable is difficult to predict.

On one hand,

communities that use more energy should have more of an incentive
to invest in energy efficiency and therefore energy use should
have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

On the

other hand, a community that has had an energy efficiency program
for many years might already exhibit low energy use.
Wilson (2008) cites size as one of the key barriers to EE
program development at POUs.

I evaluate a utility’s size by

examining both total customers and total sales (kWh) data.

I

expect size to have a positive relationship with the dependent
variable, EE spending as a % of total revenue.
The other two energy/utility variables I examine are
percent of customers that are residential and percent of sales
that are residential.

Both variables attempt to test the

assertion that a heavy residential customer base is a common
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barrier to energy efficiency program development (Wilson, 2008
and others).

I expect to find a positive relationship between

residential customers or load and the dependent variable.
Table 3.5: Independent Variables

Energy /
Utility

Socio-economic

Housing Stock

Political

Variable
-State (Dummy)
-Ownership Type (Dummy)
-Total Customers
-Total Sales
-Electric Rate
-Residential Electric
Energy Use
-% of Customers are
Residential
-% of Sales are
Residential
-Mean Household Income
-% of population 25 or
older w/ Bachelor’s
Degree or higher

Source
EIA-861

2010 5-year ACS –
township-level data
aggregated based on
utility electric
service area
2010 5-year ACS –
township-level data
aggregated based on
utility electric
service area

% of Housing units which
are:
-Owner-occupied
-Single Family Houses
-Mobile Homes
-Built before 1940
-Built after 1979
-% of Housing units
heated with:
-Gas
-LPG (Propane)
-Electricity
-Wood
-% of residents who voted State election
for President Obama in
websites – county2008
level data aggregated
based on utility
electric service area

I include a number of variables to represent socio-economic
factors and characteristics of the housing stock that may impact
the demand for energy efficiency.
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All are taken from the 2010 5-

year American Community Survey (ACS).

Data are collected at the

municipal and township level, weighted, and combined according
the service areas of utilities.
Because of the non-contiguous nature of electric utility
service areas, it is difficult to assign ACS data to individual
utilities.

The data in this research are a reasonable attempt to

assign township-level data to utilities.
were done in near identical ways.

Indiana and Wisconsin

In each a detailed statewide

map with both utility service territories and township boundaries
was used to assign each township an electric utility.

If a

municipal utility was in the township, then the utility was
assigned to the township.

If a township had a mix of providers,

it was generally assigned to the provider who serviced the most
territory in the township.

Exceptions were made when a large

town or small city appeared to be the bulk of the township’s
households in which case whichever provider served the populated
area was assigned to the township.
Iowa was done in a similar way to Wisconsin and Indiana,
except a service territory map could not be found that had
township boundaries, only county lines.

So townships could not

be assigned based on which provider served the bulk of the
township.

Except for townships served entirely by IOUs or

containing a MU, nearly every township in Iowa is served by both
a REC and IOU with the IOU serving the more populated area of the
township.

Since the goal is to get a good picture of a utility’s
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customers, if a township was serviced by a REC in any significant
way, it was assigned to that REC unless the township had more
than 1,000 households.

Then it was assumed that a substantial

majority of the township’s households were concentrated in the
populated areas and thus served by the IOU.

In Michigan there

was not a detailed service territory map available.

But the

state’s public utility commission’s website does provide a list
of electric provider by city, town, and township.

That was used

to assign a list of cities, towns, and townships to each utility.
Once each of the states’ utilities had a list of cities,
towns, and townships assigned, then township-level data was
aggregated and averaged on a weighted basis (per number of
households, adults over 25, or housing units depending on the
variable).

This left a clear estimate for each independent

variable.
Socio-economic data includes mean household income and
educational attainment.

In a study of Minnesota POUs, Wilson

(2008) cites low incomes as a common barrier to program
development.

By estimating mean household income for each

utilities service area, I am able to test this assumption. I
expect income to have a positive relationship with the dependent
variable.

To evaluate whether the education level of a utility’s

customers helps predict EE program spending, I look at the
percent of population over 25 with at least a Bachelor’s degree.
Considering that a lack of information has traditionally been a
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barrier to energy efficiency, I expect that a more educated
population (and presumably more informed) would be more likely to
lobby their utility and support energy efficiency programs.
The type of housing an area has certainly influences its
energy use and could potentially influence demand for energy
efficiency.

While some variables like the age or how many

housing units are in the building affect energy usage, other
variables like percentage of rental units relate to the issue of
a split-incentive and the problems it creates for energy
efficiency.

Overall, I consider the following types of housing

stock date (the percentage of households that are): single family
residences, mobile homes, built after 1979, built before 1940 and
owner-occupied.
It’s difficult to hypothesize relationships for many of
these variables.

For instance, because older homes tend to use

more energy than newer homes, a community with a high percentage
of the older variety should logically have a greater demand for
energy efficiency. Yet older homes also present many structural
roadblocks to energy efficiency like older wiring, moisture
issues and potential access problems.

So it’s possible that an

area with older housing would be less likely to invest in energy
efficiency because of these barriers.

Likewise, high percentages

of mobile homes and rental units could suggest an area greatly in
need of creative energy efficiency programs, but the barriers
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that mobile homes and the split-incentive create would actually
prohibit programs from being developed.
Additionally I include data on how people heat their homes,
the percent of households that heat with: natural gas, LPG
(propane), electricity and wood.

Of these four types, the use of

electricity to heat is the variable most likely to have a
relationship with how an area’s utility invests in energy
efficiency.

Traditionally, electric heat has been the most

energy-intensive way to heat a space and therefore has been
targeted by energy efficiency programs for decades.

While higher

shares of electric heat would be an argument for more energy
efficiency spending, it’s also likely that lower shares could
indicate an area that has already aggressively targeted electric
heat in past programs and therefore indicates an area that
strongly favors energy efficiency.

The preponderance of electric

heat is also geographic, the more south one goes the more likely
that the heat is electrically provided.

In this research Indiana

has higher rates of electric heat than the other states and it is
also more south than the others.
I also explore a political variable in this research.

When

state-level energy efficiency investments are compared nationally
(see Figure 2.1), states on the Pacific Coast and in the
Northeast tend to lead the nation, followed closely by states in
the Upper Midwest.

States in the South, Lower Midwest,

Southwest, Mountain West and Plains states tend to lag behind.
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Is it a coincidence that the more energy efficient states also
tend to vote for Democrats in Presidential elections while those
that lag behind support Republicans?

This variable explores that

connection at the county and utility-level.
The percent each county voted for President Barack Obama in
2008 was collected from state election websites.

These

percentages were then attached to the township and city data and
aggregated by weighted average the same way ACS data was
combined.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1

Descriptive Statistics

4.1.1 Energy Efficiency Programs? Yes or No?
Much of the literature on energy efficiency programs
suggests that IOUs are more likely to operate programs than RECs
or MUs (Wilson, 2008; Fischlein, 2009; Frieschlag, 2011, Smith,
2010).

This is traditionally attributed to a state regulatory

framework that sets energy efficiency standards for IOUs while
exempting POUs.

The four states in this thesis regulate

utilities differently when it comes to energy efficiency.

This

variety in regulation helps explain the different levels of
program coverage in each of the states.
Of the 474 utilities examined 78% operated energy
efficiency programs in 2010 (Table 4.1).

Michigan, with its

clear policy that requires IOUs and POUs to offer a program had
100% coverage.

Wisconsin also found every utility in the state

spending part of their budget on energy efficiency, either
through the state-branded program Focus on Energy or operating an
independent program.

Although Wisconsin had complete coverage in

2010, their EERS was not to take effect until 2011.

Since

Wisconsin has had energy efficiency programs for decades now,
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it’s likely that most utilities have chosen to pursue energy
efficiency voluntarily over the past few years.
Table 4.1: Percentage of Utilities with Energy Efficiency Programs by
State and Ownership Type (2010)

State
Iowa
Ind.
Mich.
Wisc.
All

IOU
67%*

Large
MU
100%

Small
MU
95%

REC
98%

All
96%

Number of
Utilities
180

100%

0%

0%

41%

19%

118

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

58

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

118

96%

68%

77%

76%

78%

474

Note: *Only the two large IOUs operate programs in Iowa. The third IOU
is the Amana Colony, a Mennonite like religious community. They are
very small and likely exempted from the state regulations.

While Iowa requires a certain energy saving standard of its
IOUs, it instructs its POUs to operate an energy efficiency
program, set goals and report on the results.

Yet it does not

set minimum standards for the programs or goals.

Still though,

170 of the 177 POUs in Iowa operated programs in 2010.
Considering there’s still a voluntary nature to programs at POUs
in Iowa, it’s good to see such high numbers of program coverage.
Fully 96% of Iowan utilities operate programs.

In 2010,

utilities in Indiana had not fully adopted the recently passed
EERS and therefore there were no energy efficiency program
requirements in the state.

All five of the IOUs and almost half

of the RECs operated programs.

Overall less than 20% of

utilities spent on energy efficiency in Indiana.
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4.1.2 Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue
Once levels of program coverage have been established, I
move on to analyzing levels of spending for those programs.
First, I evaluate the dependent variable, program spending
normalized by a utility’s total revenue, in terms of the state
variable.

Second, I look at the dependent variable solely in

terms of ownership type.

Next, state and ownership variables are

combined and I look for trends.

Finally, I split up the

utilities into four segments based on the strength of their
dependent variable value and look for potential relationships
with the independent variables.
Based on a review of state medians and means for utility
program spending, the “average utility” in Iowa and Michigan has
greater levels of EE spending than the “average utility” in
Wisconsin or Indiana (Table 4.2).

Aside from having the highest

mean spending/revenue, Iowa also has the greatest dispersion
among its utilities.

Its standard deviation is more than twice

those of the other states.

Considering that Iowa only requires

minimum program standards of two of its utilities, that leaves
the vast majority of utilities free to set their own standards.
While that does result it low levels of funding at some utilities
it also results in some high spending at others (Figure 4.1).
In contrast Michigan has the most specific instructions to
its utilities in terms of program spending and energy saving
goals.

It requires the same minimum energy saving standard for
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all utilities, as well as imposing a spending cap.

This might

help explain Michigan’s low standard deviation and smaller
dispersion than Iowa’s or Wisconsin.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, Specific to
State Data-subsets

State
Iowa
Indiana
Michigan
Wisconsin
All

N

Mean

Median

180
118
58
118
474

0.95%
0.08%
0.85%
0.60%
0.63%

0.75%
0.00%
0.85%
0.47%
0.47%

Standard Deviation
0.91%
0.20%
0.35%
0.40%
0.71%

Figure 4.1: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue,
State Factor

Energy Efficiency Program Spending
as a % of Total Revenue - (2010)
5.0%
4.5%
4.0%

3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
Iowa

Ind.

Mich.

Wisc.

Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes. So many of Indiana’s utilities
have 0% program spending that the 3rd quartile for the state is at 0.
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Wisconsin is similar to both Iowa and Michigan.

In 2010

Wisconsin did not have an EERS in effect and therefore did not
impose clear standards upon all utilities.

Like Iowa, Wisconsin

has a greater dispersion than Michigan with higher spending
outliers.

However, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, Wisconsin’s box

plot, the heart of its data, is below Michigan’s.
Program spending at Indianan utilities hardly even shows up
on the box plot in Figure 4.1.

The 3rd quartile of the data is at

0 and only the few IOUs and RECs with programs show up in the
range.
Figure 4.2: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue,
Ownership Type Factor

Energy Efficiency Program Spending
as a % of Total Revenue - (2010)
5.0%
4.5%
4.0%
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%

0.5%
0.0%
IOU

MU-L

MU-S

REC

Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes.
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From a comparison of box plots (Figures 4.1 and 4.2),
ownership type appears to have less of an influence over the
dependent variable.
and 1%.

All four types are concentrated between 0

While the dispersions for small MUs and IOUs rise up

above 3% and 4%, the bulk of each type’s spending/revenue is
similar.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue, Specific to
Ownership Type Data-subsets

Ownership

N

Mean

Median

Stand. Dev.

IOU

28

0.97%

0.94%

0.77%

Large MU

38

0.55%

0.58%

0.48%

Small MU

292

0.59%

0.38%

0.77%

REC

116

0.68%

0.55%

0.57%

All

474

0.63%

0.47%

0.71%

Looking at means and medians, a difference emerges (Table
4.3).

IOUs exhibit the highest spending levels, almost 1%.

RECs

appear to have the next highest average with a mean of 0.68% and
a median of 0.55%.

MUs have the lowest funding levels with small

MUs’ mean slightly higher than large MUs, but their median much
lower at 0.38%.

Unlike the state comparisons, there is not as

much variance in standard deviation within the ownership datasubsets.
behind.

IOUs and small MUs have the highest, with RECs not far
Only large MUs have a relatively concentrated dataset.

Based on my belief that states control more for program/spending
variance than ownership type, it makes sense that the former’s
dispersions would be smaller.

The greater dispersions (standard
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deviations) in the ownership types suggest that the data is being
dispersed by more controlling factors (i.e. states).

When a box plot of states and ownerships types is create
(Figure 4.3) more trends begin to emerge.

I am able to see how

ownership types rank in certain states, whether a pattern follows
in each state or just one.

Also, I am able to see where trends

run opposite each other within individual states.
Figure 4.3: Energy Efficiency Program Spending as a % of Total Revenue,
States and Ownership Types

Energy Efficiency Program Spending as
a % of Total Revenue (2010)
5.0%
4.5%
4.0%
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%

Iowa

Indiana

Michigan

REC

MU-S

MU-L

IOU

REC

MU-S

MU-L

IOU

REC

MU-S

MU-L

IOU

REC

MU-S

MU-L

IOU

0.0%

Wisconsin

Note: This box plot shows both the range: the solid black lines, and
the 1st and 3rd quartiles: the boxes. Much of Indiana’s data are 0,
including all of MU-L and MU-S and over half of REC.

Figure 4.3 again emphasizes the wide dispersion of
spending/revenue that Iowa utilities have.
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Both IOUs have high

numbers (the third IOU, Amana Society Services, serves the Amana
Colonies, a Mennonite-like community and must be excluded from
regulation as they do not offer a program).

Thirteen of the top

14 utilities in the overall dataset are small MUs and RECs in
Iowa. And the averages for large MUs and RECs in Iowa are higher
than any other ownership category in any other state.

The

relative high numbers for all types of utilities in Iowa is a
strong argument for the controlling factor of the state variable.
With Indiana’s data-subset dominated by utilities without
EE programs, only the IOUs and RECs show data above zero.

Even

with over half of Indiana’s RECs not operating programs (and
therefore with 0% for spending/revenue) RECs still have greater
mean spending/revenue (0.21%) than IOUs (0.12%).

For just the 17

RECs that have EE programs the mean average in 2010 was 0.51%,
which is not that much below the overall average for RECs across
all four states.
After Iowa, Michigan performs the best of the three
remaining states.

Like Iowa, IOUs and RECs have the best results

followed by large MUs and then small MUs.

Unlike the other

states, RECs in Michigan have spending levels on par with IOUs.
Average spending/revenue numbers in Wisconsin tend to better
represent what some studies have suggested: that IOUs invest
more, followed by large MUs and then small MUs and RECs.
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4.1.3 Cross-tabulation Analysis
As part of the analysis process, the dependent variable,
program spending as % of revenue, is divided into four segments.
First, utilities without programs are grouped together and then
the remaining 360 utilities are divided into three groups of 123,
123 and 124.

Then mean averages are taken for each group within

each independent variable.

(Median averages were used for total

customers and total sales because of the extreme variation in
utility size.)

This process is not only done for all the

utilities, but also within each state and ownership model.

This

helps identify where possible relationships exist between the
independent and dependent variables, controlling for both the
state and ownership factors.
Table 4.4: States and Shares of Spending/revenue Tiers

States

IA

Upper Third

IN

MI

WI

42%

1%

43%

18%

22%

8%

48%

39%

31%

10%

9%

43%

4%

82%

0%

0%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Middle Third
Lower Third
No Program
All

Table 4.4 shows the four states broken down into shares for
each spending/revenue tier.
data.

Iowa shows sizable shares of the

Considering that 38% of the total utilities are in Iowa

this makes sense.

Iowa has many utilities dispersed throughout

the dataset (upper – 42%, middle - 22% and lower - 31% of Iowa’s
48

utilities), while nearly all of Indiana’s utilities (82%) did not
operate a program in 2010.

Michigan’s utilities are concentrated

in the upper and middle thirds of the data, 43% and 48%
respectively.

On the other hand, Wisconsin’ utilities are

concentrated in the middle and lower thirds, 39% and 43%
respectively.
Table 4.5 is similar to Table 4.4, but it shows ownership
type shares.
spending.

Over half of IOUs (54%) are in the upper third of

Small MUs are concentrated more on the lower spectrum

of spending, while RECs tend to be more on the upper end.
Similar to the analysis of Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2, the
evaluation of ownership type independent of the state variable is
limited.
Table 4.5: Ownership Types and Shares Spending/revenue Tiers

Ownership
Upper Third
Middle Third
Lower Third
No Program

IOU
MU-L
MU-S
REC
54%
19%
21%
35%
19%

40%

25%

25%

25%

10%

31%

18%

3%

31%

23%

22%

100%

100%

100%

100%

All
After examining the tiers of spending/revenue data in terms
of states and ownership types, I look at the independent
variables for potential relationships. Tables 4.6-4.8 show the
mean averages for each of the potential 18 independent variables
at each of the four tiers of spending/revenue.
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I do this

calculation in the six datasets and data-subsets that are
included in the regression analysis.

These include overall

dataset, the POU data-subset and then each of the four state/POU
data-subsets.

Using these six allow me to see potential trends

overall, within only POUs and then within POUs in particular
states.
Looking at the overall dataset, a few variables show signs
of a potential relationship (bolded and italicized).

Size, both

total customers and total sales, suggests a positive
relationship.

Because of the wide dispersion of utility size

(extremely large utilities in the upper and lower thirds),
medians are presented in Table 4.6.

Total sales appears to be

positive in POUs, IA and MI, while total customers suggests
positive relationships in just IA and MI.

Only the Indiana data-

subset suggests a negative relationship with size.

The data in

Indiana does show that utilities that do not operate programs are
much smaller than those that do.
Both percentage of customers that are residential (% res
cust) and percentage of sales that are residential (% res load)
suggest positive relationships–that the higher percent of
residential customers and sales, the greater relative investment
in energy efficiency.

Either one or both of these variables

appears to have a positive relationship in every data-subset
except for Indiana.

This is curious because a large residential
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load or customer base has been seen as a barrier to energy
efficiency programs.
Two other variables that suggest a potential relationship
overall are % Obama voters and % mobile homes, both negative.
When the relationship between political leanings and program
spending is considered at the state-level (Figure 2-1), it
appears there’s a positive relationship between spending and
Democratic support.

Yet, within the overall dataset, as well as

the POU data-subset, the data is suggesting that the relationship
is negative.

In Michigan however, % Obama voters appears to have

a positive relationship.
negative relationship.

The other, % mobile homes, suggests a

When broken down, relationships appear to

be a mix of positive (IA and IN) and negative (POUs and WI).
The heating fuel variable data also hint at potential
relationships.

People that heat their homes with electricity

have traditionally been one of the low-hanging fruit that utility
energy efficiency programs have targeted first.

Overall, there

appears to be a positive relationship between % elect heat and
spending/revenue.
Iowa.

This also looks to be the case within POUs and

The % wood heat variable suggests a negative overall

relationship.

Within subsets it looks both positive (IA) and

negative (POUs and WI).

These breakdowns are similar to the

subset splits for % mobile homes.

Since both variables are

potential proxies for how rural an area is, these relationships
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help hint at the overall relationship between program spending
and how rural an area is.
At this level of analysis, I didn’t find much potential for
relationships between the dependent variable and income,
electricity rates, energy use, educational attainment or many of
the housing stock variables.

For some of the variables like

rate, energy use and educational attainment, the problem is
likely how the variable was calculated.

Unlike the variable

total sales, a variable like rate has little variability in its
numbers and therefore little room to indicate relationships.

My

calculation for rate (total sales / total revenue) might be too
simple to create a dataset with enough variability to show
relationships.

In future studies it would be preferable to find

a calculation for these variables that creates more variability
in the data.
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Table 4.6: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and
Ownership Variables I
Res
Energ
Total
y Use
Spendi Total
Sales
Rate (MWh/
%
Data Tier
ng/rev Cust.
(mWh)
(¢/k cust.
Res.
set
s
N
enue
Median
Median
Wh)
)
Cust.
Over
Up.
3,185
80,159
123
1.540%
9.9
10.98 86.8%
all
Mid.
2,586
45,584
86.0%
123
.654%
10.2
9.87
Low.
1,395
28,000
124
.245%
9.8
10.33 84.5%
None
104
.000%
2,027
60,749
9.1
11.78 86.8%
All
474
.639%
2,065
48,982
9.8
10.70 86.0%
POUs
Up.
51,908
108
1.550%
2,221
10.2 11.37 86.7%
Mid.
44,607
118
.648%
2,554
10.3 10.01 86.0%
Low.
25,627
117
.251%
1,371
10.0 10.29 84.3%
None
103
.000%
2,113
60,552
10.0 11.79 86.9%
All
446
.613%
1,896
40,915
10.1 10.83 85.9%
IA/
Up.
1,488
28,383
74
1.703%
10.0 12.78 86.4%
POUs Mid.
999
21,590
40
.693%
10.0 11.92 83.8%
Low.
798
12,800
56
.215%
10.0 10.84 83.2%
None
486
6,180
9.78
7
.000%
10.0
86.8%
All
177
.967%
965
16,872
10.0 11.85 84.9%
IN/
Up.
1
1.221% 13,108 279,494 10.0 13.64 92.7%
POUs Mid.
9
.574%
19,180 374,586 10.0 15.54 96.2%
Low.
7
.317%
14,412 439,328 10.0 15.62 93.2%
None
96
.000%
2,470
66,627
10.0 11.94 86.9%
All
113
.076%
3,560
94,786
10.0 12.47 88.0%
MI/
Up.
8,627
148,810 11.1
7.42
18
1.163%
87.7%
POUs Mid.
4,001
66,307
10.7
7.23
28
.682%
84.4%
Low.
1,325
20,479
10.0
5.96
4
.158%
85.5%
None
0
All
50
.813%
4,478
77,545
10.8
7.20
85.7%
WI/
Up.
86.7%
15
1.279%
4,255
96,479
10.0
9.02
POUs Mid.
86.0%
41
.597%
2,401
43,630
10.5
8.83
Low.
84.3%
50
.290%
2,634
72,906
10.0
9.27
None
0
All
106
.549%
2,739
63,735
10.2
9.06
86.0%
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%
Res.
Load
50.4%
49.0%
44.6%
51.4%
48.7%
52.4%
49.3%
45.9%
51.8%
49.7%
54.0%
49.3%
53.5%
50.2%
52.6%
59.3%
71.9%
52.6%
51.5%
52.3%
47.9%
39.6%
28.2%
41.7%
45.9%
51.0%
37.8%
44.1%

Table 4.7: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and
Ownership Variables II
%
%
%
Bach
%
Singl
Spendi Obama
or
Owner e
Data Tier
ng/rev Voter
Mean HH Highe Occup Famil
set
s
N
enue
s
Inc.
r
ied
y
Over
Up.
123 1.560% 49.5% $58,325 22.9% 77.7% 80.9%
all
Mid.
51.7% $56,452 21.3% 76.5% 77.5%
123
.654%
Low.
53.2% $58,271 22.6% 77.4% 79.9%
124
.245%
None
104
.000%
43.6% $59,290 19.9% 78.6% 80.9%
All
474
.639%
49.8% $58,037 21.7% 77.5% 79.7%
POUs
Up.
108 1.550% 48.9% $60,271 21.4% 83.3% 87.5%
Mid.
50.4% $58,933 18.7% 84.0% 85.7%
118
.648%
Low.
51.8% $63,713 21.6% 84.5% 85.7%
117
.251%
None
103
.000%
42.8% $67,525 19.5% 85.3% 86.7%
All
446
.613%
48.5% $62,123 20.4% 84.1% 86.5%
IA/
Up.
74
1.703% 47.8% $58,617 22.3% 79.0% 85.9%
POUs Mid.
40
.693%
47.4% $57,238 20.4% 79.1% 83.8%
Low.
56
.215%
51.7% $57,405 24.2% 78.6% 85.3%
None
7
.000%
48.3% $67,261 23.2% 80.8% 84.3%
All
177
.967%
48.9% $58,264 22.5% 79.0% 85.1%
IN/
Up.
1
1.221% 47.3% $61,999 22.9% 90.1% 84.1%
POUs Mid.
9
.574%
42.0% $62,703 20.7% 85.7% 83.8%
Low.
7
.317%
43.0% $65,797 20.8% 86.7% 78.2%
None
96
.000%
43.2% $58,645 19.7% 78.3% 80.6%
All
113
.076%
43.1% $59,441 19.9% 79.5% 81.1%
MI/
Up.
18
1.163% 52.3% $52,334 22.1% 76.7% 74.6%
POUs Mid.
49.8% $50,825 21.7% 67.8% 68.8%
28
.682%
Low.
49.8% $51,789 13.5% 74.4% 77.6%
4
.158%
None
0
All
50
.813%
50.7% $51,445 21.2% 71.6% 71.6%
WI/
Up.
15
1.279% 50.5% $64,504 25.5% 73.6% 70.7%
POUs Mid.
41
.597%
58.1% $58,212 21.6% 78.3% 76.8%
Low.
50
.290%
56.6% $58,683 21.4% 75.8% 74.3%
None
0
All
106
.549%
56.3% $59,324 22.1% 76.4% 74.8%
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%
Mobil
e
Home
5.0%
5.5%
5.6%
8.0%
5.9%
6.7%
9.2%
10.0%
9.0%
8.4%
4.0%
3.9%
3.5%
4.1%
3.8%
14.6%
12.9%
11.3%
8.3%
8.8%
7.9%
3.9%
9.2%
5.7%
4.4%
6.3%
7.1%
6.4%

Table 4.8: Cross-tabulation of Dependent Variable with State and
Ownership Variables III
%
Spendi
%
%
% LPG Elect
Datas Tier
ng/rev Houses Houses % Gas (Prop
ric
et
s
N
enue
1939
1980
Heat
ane)
Heat
Overa Up.
123 1.560%
31.7%
27.1%
51.2% 24.7% 14.8%
ll
Mid. 123
.654%
30.7%
28.2%
57.2% 18.2% 13.9%
Low. 124
.245%
31.5%
27.5%
53.3% 21.5% 13.3%
None 104
.000%
28.4%
31.5%
54.2% 19.0% 19.2%
All
474
.639%
30.7%
28.4%
54.0% 20.9% 15.1%
POUs
Up.
108 1.550%
33.0%
26.3%
49.9% 25.8% 15.5%
Mid. 118
.648%
31.1%
27.9%
57.8% 17.7% 13.9%
Low. 117
.251%
32.3%
27.1%
52.6% 22.3% 13.0%
None 103
.000%
28.3%
31.4%
53.9% 19.0% 19.4%
All
446
.613%
31.2%
28.1%
53.6% 21.2% 15.3%
IA/
Up.
37.6%
21.8%
74
1.703%
45.8% 29.7% 17.8%
POUs Mid.
37.8%
20.4%
40
.693%
57.7% 21.2% 15.3%
Low.
38.4%
19.2%
56
.215%
56.4% 24.2% 12.8%
None
7
.000%
32.6%
27.8%
54.1% 30.9% 11.1%
All
177
.967%
37.7%
21.1%
52.2% 26.1% 15.4%
IN/
Up.
13.6%
49.1%
1
1.221%
26.5% 35.9% 24.8%
POUs Mid.
19.7%
41.9%
9
.574%
21.3% 27.7% 37.3%
Low.
20.1%
41.1%
7
.317%
28.0% 27.8% 28.9%
None
28.0%
31.7%
96
.000%
53.9% 18.2% 19.9%
All
113
.076%
26.4%
33.3%
50.3% 19.0% 22.0%
MI/
Up.
30.2%
18
1.163%
25.2%
61.2% 17.2%
7.6%
POUs Mid.
23.7%
28
.682%
32.4%
79.5%
4.9%
9.1%
Low.
23.2%
4
.158%
27.5%
72.3% 12.2%
4.9%
None
0
All
50
.813%
29.4%
26.0%
72.5%
9.9%
8.2%
WI/
Up.
21.0%
40.7%
15
1.279%
58.0% 16.3% 12.8%
POUs Mid.
26.1%
34.9%
41
.597%
51.2% 20.8% 10.8%
Low.
27.5%
34.4%
50
.290%
50.1% 20.1% 11.6%
None
0
All
106
.549%
26.1%
35.5%
51.6% 19.8% 11.5%
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%
Wood
Heat
4.5%
5.4%
6.0%
3.4%
4.9%
4.2%
5.1%
6.1%
3.4%
4.8%
2.9%
2.6%
2.5%
0.6%
2.6%
11.5%
8.0%
8.3%
3.6%
4.2%
7.8%
2.3%
7.1%
4.6%
6.0%
8.9%
9.8%
8.9%

4.2

Regression Analysis

4.2.1 Regression Methodology and Model Creation
Through a preliminary data analysis of 18 potential
independent variables, I chose five to combine with state dummy
variables to construct a predictive model for energy efficiency
program funding as a percentage of total revenue.
1.

This is Model

I then add ownership dummy variables to Model 1 in order to

create Model 2.

Table 4.9 shows what variables are in each

model.
Table 4.9: Regression Models and their Independent Variables

Variable
Total Sales
% Res Load
% Obama
Income
% Elect Heat
Iowa
Michigan
Wisconsin
IOU
Large MU
REC

Type
Utility
Utility
Political
Economic
Heat
State
State
State
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership

Applied to all
Applied to
states (entire
individual
dataset and POU state/POU datadata-subset)
subsets
Model
Model
Model
Model
1
2
3
4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X*
X
X
X
X

*Note: The IOU dummy variable in Model 2 is only included when model
is applied to entire dataset. It is not included when Model 2 is
applied to the POU data-subset.
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For the first part of the analysis I apply the two models
to the overall dataset and then to just the POU data-subset.
Model 1 allows me to look for the effects of the state variables
as well any significant relationships between the dependent
variable and the five independent variables when controlling for
state effects.

Model 2 allows me to additionally evaluate for

the influence of ownership type across all the states.

By

applying Model 2 to both the overall dataset and the POU datasubset I am able to get a better understanding of what the
effects of ownership type are.

I am also able to see cases where

independent variables might have come up significant in Model 1,
but not in Model 2.

This might indicate that the variety of the

dependent variables is better explained by ownership type than by
the independent variable in question.
The next part of the analysis is applying models to
individual state data-subsets.

To create Model 3 I took Model 1

and subtracted the state dummy variables leaving only the five
independent variables (see Table 4.9).

Likewise Model 4 is

simply Model 2 without the state dummy variables and without the
IOU dummy variable.

In these two models, I am looking for

relationships between the independent and dependent variables
that are distinct to individual states.

While % Obama voters

might be insignificant overall, it might be significant and
positive in one state and significant and negative in another
state.
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Throughout these regressions, I analyze changes in
significance, direction of relationship and the weight of
coefficients. Both standardized and unstandardized beta
coefficients are evaluated.

To get an idea of how much change an

unstandardized coefficient contributes to the dependent variable,
I apply the difference between the first and third quartiles of
the independent variable’s data to the unstandardized
coefficient.

This allows me weigh the respective predictive

nature of significant independent variables.

Finally, I evaluate

variables for significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels
and each regression is tested for multi-collinearity through its
tolerance value.
The five variables included in all models are: total sales,
% res load, % Obama voters, income and % elect heat.

These were

chosen based on evaluation of the spending/revenue crosstabulations (Figures 4.6-4.8), preliminary regression analysis
and a review of the literature.

Total sales, % res load and

income have all been cited in a number of studies (Wilson, 2008,
etc…) as common barriers to program development at small and
publicly-owned utilities.

In early data analysis, total sales

and % res load also appeared likely to exhibit a relationship
with the dependent variable.

Because of the apparent correlation

between electoral politics and energy efficiency funding at the
state-level, I included % Obama voters in order to test the
relationship at the county and utility level.

Since homes that

heat with electricity are often the first target of energy
58

efficiency programs, I thought that the relative use of electric
heat would be a strong predictor of program funding.
In early analysis I applied Model 1 without state dummy
variables to the overall dataset.

This resulted in very few if

any significant independent variables and a low R-squared.

This

helps show the controlling nature of state policy and other state
factors and how little can be gained from a regression that
doesn’t take states into account.

For this reason Model 1 is

built with state dummy variables included.
Because of Indiana’s numerous utilities without programs
and little funding for those with programs, I choose to include
the other three states, IA, MI and WI, as dummy variables in
Model 1.

Likewise for the ownership dummies, I choose small MU

as the constant to regress against because in early data analysis
I found it to be the most different of the four ownership
variables.

4.2.2 Regression Results
When Model 1 is applied to the overall dataset (Table
4.10), the regression has an R-squared of 0.27 and all three
state dummy variables are significant at 99%.

Michigan has a

slightly greater coefficient than Iowa with Wisconsin not far
behind both of them.

Controlling for state factors, total sales,

% res load and % elect heat all show significant and positive
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relationships.

State variables by far are the strongest

predictors of the dependent variable.

Of the remaining

independent variables % elect heat has the strongest
relationship.

Not only does it have the highest standardized

coefficient, but its unstandardized coefficient has the greatest
effect.

If a utility’s % elect heat were to increase from the

first to the third quartile of the dataset (from 9% to 20%) their
predicted spending/revenue would increase by 0.18%.

This is

substantial considering the median spending/revenue for all
utilities is 0.47%.

While total sales and % res load are both

significant, their effects are not as important, especially total
sales.

Increasing from the first to the third quartiles of their

respective data would net increases of 0.004% for total sales and
.10% for % res load.
Model 2 is listed in Table 4.10 as well.

Adding the

ownership variables increases the R-squared from 0.27 to 0.31.
State variables are still the most controlling in the model.
Again both Michigan and Iowa have unstandardized coefficients
over 1 with Iowa slightly higher now that ownership type is being
controlled for.

The Wisconsin variable explains the dependent

variable just about as well as it did when ownership was not
included.

Of the three ownership dummies, IOU is significant at

99% and REC significant at 90%.

Large MU is not significant.

Aside from being more significant IOU has a stronger relationship
with the dependent variable than REC.
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Like the three state

variables included, all three ownership variables have positive
relationships.
Table 4.10: Regression Results with Models 1 & 2 within Overall Dataset
Overall
Model 2 - Basic w/Ownership
Model 1 - Basic
dataset
dummies

Variable
Total
Sales

Unstand.
Coefficie
nt
2.302E08***

Stand.
Coeffici
ent

Toler
ance
Value

Unstand.
Coefficie
nt

Stand.
Coeffici
ent

Tolera
nce
Value

0.113***

0.943

7.869E-09

0.039

0.612

% Res Load

0.003*

0.075*

0.909

0.002

0.069

0.699

% Obama

-0.005

-0.064

0.687

-0.006

-0.074

0.682

Income
% Elect
Heat

4.246E-06

0.065

0.927

3.376E-06

0.052

0.890

0.016***

0.193***

0.676

0.016***

0.192***

0.673

Iowa

1.026***

0.703***

0.543

1.059***

0.725***

0.527

Michigan

1.074***

0.497***

0.539

1.048***

0.485***

0.536

Wisconsin

0.779***

0.476***

0.429

0.777***

0.474***

0.426

IOU

0.424***

0.141***

0.583

Large MU

0.148

0.057

0.846

REC

0.135*

0.082*

0.751

Beta Coefficient
(Constant):

-0.46

Beta Coefficient
(Constant):

-0.422

Adjusted R-Squared:
0.27 Adjusted R-Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%

0.31

In the Model 2 regression within the overall dataset only %
elect heat remains significant, still at 99%.
and % res load are no longer significant.

Both total sales

With the same

unstandardized coefficient as Model 1, % elect heat in Model 2
predicts spending/revenue similarly.

The variability that is

explained by total sales in Model 1 is likely better explained by
IOU and that is why it drops from significance in Model 2.
Models 1 and 2 are then applied to the POU data-subset
(Table 4.11).

Since this research attempts to test and quantify
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barriers to program development at POUs especially, it is helpful
to look at how the same models perform with IOUs excluded from
the data.
Table 4.11: Regression Results with Models 1 & 2 within POU Data-subset
POU dataModel 2 - Basic w/Ownership
Model 1 – Basic
subset
dummies
Unstand.
Coefficie
nt

Stand.
Coeffici
ent

Toler
ance
Level

Unstand.
Coefficie
nt

Stand.
Coeffici
ent

Toler
ance
Level

2.403E-07

0.070

0.829

6.914E-08

0.020

0.520

% Res Load

0.003**

0.089**

0.880

0.002

0.058

0.639

% Obama

-0.005785

-0.075

0.687

-0.006

-0.072

0.685

Income
% Elect
Heat

3.887E-06

0.062

0.890

3.542E-06

0.056

0.883

0.015***

0.186***

0.673

0.015***

0.188***

0.669

Iowa

1.025***

0.717***

0.530

1.030***

0.720***

0.527

Michigan

1.043***

0.471***

0.564

1.041***

0.470***

0.564

Wisconsin

0.751***

0.457***

0.434

0.745***

0.453***

0.433

0.1083085

0.043

0.646

0.126
0.079
Beta Coefficient
(Constant):

0.568

Variable
Total
Sales

Large MU
REC
Beta Coefficient
(Constant):

-0.44

Adjusted R-Squared:
0.29
Adjusted R-Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%

-0.40
0.30

When I apply Model 1 to the POU data-subset I get an Rsquared of 0.29, very similar to the 0.27 when Model 1 is applied
to the overall dataset.

All three state variables are again

significant at 99% and have positive coefficients very close to
the entire dataset regression.

The independent variable % elect

heat has a slightly smaller coefficient, still strongly
predictive though.

While total sales is not significant like it

is when Model 1 in regressed in the overall dataset, % res load
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has the same coefficient and is now significant at 95% rather
than 90%.
When I apply Model 2 to the POU data-subset, the IOU dummy
variable is naturally removed from the model.

This leaves just

Large MU and REC in Model 2 along with the five independent
variables and three state variables.

While this regression

increases the R-squared by a percentage point to 0.30, neither of
the ownership variables are significant and % res load is no
longer significant.

Otherwise the three state variables and %

elect heat all have similar coefficients to their results in the
other three regressions in Tables 4.10 and 4.11.
Following the analysis of the independent variables
controlling for state factors, I apply models to each state/POU
data-subset.

For the same reason I created Model 2, (in order to

evaluate potential barriers to program development specifically
at POUs), I found it necessary to remove IOUs from this level of
analysis by creating a POU-only data-subset for each state.

IOUs

also number quite few in each state which makes their inclusion
as a dummy variable difficult.
For each state I apply two models.

Model 3 consists of the

five basic independent variables: total sales, % res load, %
Obama voters, income, and % elect heat.

Model 4 consists of the

five independent variables plus two ownership variables: large MU
and REC.
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Table 4.12: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Iowa/POU datasubset
Iowa/POU
Model 4 - State Basic
Model 3 - State Basic
data-subset
w/Ownership dummies

Variable
Total Sales
% Res Load
% Obama
Income
% Elect
Heat
Large MU
REC

Unstand.
Coefficien
t
1.005E-06*
.006
-0.008
5.080E-06
0.024**

Stand.
Coeffic
ient
0.141*
.127
-0.079
.055
0.207**

Beta Coefficient
(Constant):

Toler
ance
Level
.823
.839
.840
.932
.836

Unstand.
Coefficie
nt
9.920E-07
.006
-0.008
4.915E-06
0.024**

Stand.
Coeffic
ient
.139
.115
-0.075
.053
0.206**

Toler
ance
Level
.343
.660
.829
.929
.833

-.146
.058

-.021
.028

.510
.560

Beta Coefficient
(Constant):
Adjusted RAdjusted R-Squared: 0.08
Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%
0.26

0.27
0.09

When Model 3 is applied to the Iowa/POU data-subset (Table
4.12), both total sales and % elect heat come up significant.
Unlike the Model 1 regression in the overall dataset, total sales
in the Iowa/POU data-subset shows a relationship that is not only
significant, but also has a stronger coefficient.

A utility that

increased in size from the first quartile to the third (a gain of
55,718 kWh worth of sales) would increase spending/revenue by
0.06%.

Like regressions in Models 1 and 2, % elect heat shows a

positive relationship with a coefficient of 0.024.

A first to

third quartile increase in homes heated with electricity would
increase program spending/revenue in Iowa by 0.24%, a sizable
amount considering the median spending/revenue for Iowa POUs is
only 0.75%.
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Model 4 evaluates whether controlling for the type of POU
within each state adds variation and clarity to the model.
Iowa, only % elect heat is significant in Model 4.
MU or REC is significant.

In

Neither large

Not only is total sales no longer

significant, but its tolerance score is below 0.4.

The R-squared

for each of Models 3 or 4 is below 0.10.
Table 4.13: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Indiana/POU datasubset
Ind/POU
Model 4 - State Basic
dataModel 3 - State Basic
w/Ownership dummies
subset
Stand.
Toler
Unstand.
Stand.
Unstand.
Coeffici
ance
Coefficien Coeffici
Variable Coefficient
ent
Level
t
ent
Total
3.011E-07***
0.319***
.758
1.406E-07
.149
Sales
% Res
.003***
0.278***
.830
.001
.146
Load
0.003
0.090
.901
0.003
0.099
% Obama
-4.851E-07
-.029
.785
-1.298E-06
-.078
Income
% Elect
0.008***
0.373***
.870
0.008***
0.365***
Heat
-.004
-.007
Large MU
0.148***
0.350***
REC
Beta Coefficient
Beta Coefficient
(Constant):
-0.39
(Constant):
Adjusted R-Squared:
0.34
Adjusted R-Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%

Toler
ance
Level
.375
.696
.879
.746
.813
.535
.475
-0.30
0.42

Within this data, Indiana (Table 4.13) is really defined by
a sizable portion of utilities within the state without EE
programs.

Less than half of the RECs and no MUs operated

programs in 2010. When Model 3 is applied to the Indiana/POU
data-subset, total sales, % res load and % elect heat are all
significant and positive.

In Model 4 both % elect heat and REC

are highly significant and positive.

Considering that RECs are

the only utilities without zeros for the dependent variable this
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makes sense.

The highly significant % elect heat could help

explain why those RECs voluntarily choose to establish an EE
program.
Table 4.14: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Michigan/POU datasubset
Mich/POU
Model 4 - State Basic
Model 3 - State Basic
data-subset
w/Ownership dummies

Variable
Total Sales
% Res Load
% Obama
Income
% Elect
Heat
Large MU
REC

Unstand.
Coefficie
nt
1.042E-07
.003
0.013*
2.020E-06
.005

Stand.
Coeffi
cient
.118
.221
0.262*
.056
.057

Toler
ance
Level
.943
.884
.980
.933
.864

Unstand.
Coefficien
t
-6.310E-08
-.001
0.014**
-9.574E-07
.006

Stand.
Coeffic
ient
-.072
-.052
0.287**
-.027
.070

Toler
ance
Level
.673
.431
.942
.868
.859

.130
0.388**

.165
0.464**

.711
.406

Beta Coefficient
Beta Coefficient
(Constant):
-0.14
(Constant):
Adjusted RSquared:
0.14
Adjusted R-Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%

0.05
0.23

Michigan’s R-squared for Models 3 and 4 are 0.14 and 0.23
respectively (Table 4.14).

In Model 3 only % Obama voters is

significant and it is positive.

It has a coefficient of 0.013

which means that if a Michigan POU’s electoral support for
President Obama grew from the first quartile to the third (47% to
54%), spending/revenue would increase by 0.09%.

For perspective,

the median spending/revenue for Michigan POUs is 0.76%.

With the

inclusion of POU ownership variables in Model 4, both the
significance and strength of coefficient of % Obama voters
increase very slightly.
positive at 0.388.

Also REC is significant at 95% and

As the box plot suggests above (Figure 4.1),
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RECs in Michigan do appear to have greater spending/revenue
percentages than MUs.

Model 4 shows that even when controlling

for the independent variables in the model, RECs still spend
more.
In preliminary data analysis Wisconsin often seemed to have
more independent variables come up significant than any other
state.

When Models 3 and 4 are applied to the Wisconsin/POU

data-subset, three variables come up significant for Model 3 and
four come up for Model 4.
and significant at 99%.

In Model 3, % Obama voters is negative

Both % elect heat and income are

significant (95% and 99% respectively) and positive.

While %

elect heat has consistently come up significant in a variety of
regressions, this is the first time that income has come up
significant.

As the mean income of a utility’s service grows

from the first to third quartile of data (from $51,531 to
$64,451), spending/revenue would rise by 0.11%.

This is

equivalent to the first to third quartile rise in % elect heat.
These are significant increases considering the median
spending/revenue for Wisconsin POUs in 2010 was 0.44%.
Yet more influential in this model than either of those two
variables is % Obama voters. Unlike what was proposed in the
hypothesis (or as is indicated in Michigan), % Obama voters shows
a negative relationship in Wisconsin POUs when controlling for
the independent variables.

A first to third quartile increase in

% Obama voters would increase spending/revenue by 0.14%.
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Table 4.15: Regression Results from Models 3 & 4 in Wisconsin/POU datasubset
Wisc/POU
Model 4 - State Basic
Model 3 - State Basic
data-subset
w/Ownership dummies

Variable
Total Sales
% Res Load
% Obama
Income
% Elect
Heat
Large MU
REC

Unstand.
Coefficien
t
-2.290E-07
.003
-0.015***
8.807E06***
0.015**

Stand.
Coefficie
nt
-.078
.151
-0.312***
0.278***

Tole
ranc
e
Leve
l
.931
.840
.971
.929

0.215**

.863

Unstand.
Coefficien
t
-2.103E-07
0.005*
-0.016***
8.046E06***
0.014**

Stand.
Coefficie
nt
-.071
0.308*
-0.316***
0.254***

Tole
ranc
e
Leve
l
.356
.278
.969
.899

0.208**

.860

-.156
.107

-.175
.088

.243
.447

Beta Coefficient
Beta Coefficient
(Constant):
0.63 (Constant):
Adjusted R-Squared:
0.19 Adjusted R-Squared:
Note: Levels of significance: ***99%, **95%, *90%

0.60
0.21

Model 4 in the Wisconsin/POU data-subset shows the same
significant variables as Model 3 except that % res load is also
significant.

While variable’s coefficient is large, its

tolerance value is quite low at 0.278.

Likewise total sales and

large MU both have low tolerance values.

With such low levels it

is best not to trust the results of the Model 4 regression in the
Wisconsin/POU data-subset.
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4.2.3 Independent Variable Findings
Table 4.16: Found Relationships of Independent Variables to Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable
Total Sales
% Res Load
% Obama Voters
Income
% Elect Heat
Michigan
Iowa
Wisconsin
Indiana
REC
Small MU
Large MU
IOU

Type
Utility
Utility
Political
Housing
Heat
State
State
State
State
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership

Hypothesized
Relationship
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive

Found
Relationship
Positive
Positive
Positive/Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Undetermined
Positive

State – The state variable was found to be the most
predictive of any factor.

Regardless of whether ownership

variables are included or whether IOUs are excluded from the data
being regressed, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin hold consistent
coefficients.

Even the coefficient for Wisconsin, the weakest of

the states, is greater than the strongest independent variable, %
elect heat, or any of the ownership dummy variables. When
ownership variables are not controlled for (and the five
independent variables are), Michigan is slightly stronger.

When

ownership dummy variables are included, Iowa is slightly
stronger.
Ownership – When Model 2 is applied to the overall dataset,
IOUs come up as the strongest in terms of program funding.
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While

RECs are found to have a positive effect as well, it is much less
than IOUs when controlling for states and the five independent
variables.

When IOUs are excluded from the data, RECs indicate a

positive relationship to EE spending in Michigan and Indiana.
However when Model 2 is applied to the POU dataset, RECs do not
come up significant.

This suggests there’s not strong variation

between MUs and RECs across all four states.
show a significant relationship.

Large MUs never

It’s likely that there’s not

enough variability between large and small MUs.
Total sales – When Model 1 is applied to the overall
dataset, total sales has a positive and significant relationship
with spending/revenue.

Yet when ownership type is controlled

for, total sales is no longer significant.

This suggests that

the size of the utility does matter in many cases; but size has
more to do with IOUs generally being larger than POUs.

When IOUs

are excluded from data (as when Model is applied to the POU datasubset), total sales is not significant.

However within Iowa and

Indiana POUs total sales is significant and positive.
% res load – While % res load is significant and positive
in Model 1 regressions it is insignificant in Model 2 when
ownership type is controlled for.

These are the results both in

the overall dataset and within just the POUs.

Initially this

finding of a positive relationship seems at odds with earlier
studies that cited a large residential load as a barrier to
energy efficiency program development.
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Yet, it’s likely that the

seemingly positive relationship is more a result of much higher
residential loads at RECs than small MUs (65% to 46%) than a
positive relationship independent of ownership type.

RECs have

shown to have greater spending/revenue than small MUs and when
ownership is controlled for, % res load is no longer significant.
Within states, % res load only came up significant in Indiana and
again it’s likely due to some RECs spending on programs and no
MUs spending on programs.
% Obama voters – Because of the apparent correlation
between state-level funding for energy efficiency and how likely
states vote for the Democratic candidate in presidential
elections, it was presumed that the relationship would continue
to be positive at the county and utility-level.
suggest this to be the case in Michigan.

% Obama voters is the

only significant variable in both regressions.
however, the variable has a negative sign.

Models 3 and 4

In Wisconsin

Of the three

independent variables that are significant, % Obama voters is the
strongest predictor in Wisconsin.

Often in spatial analysis an

electoral variable becomes a proxy for a measure of how rural an
area is.

Liberals live in cities and conservatives live in the

country.

Yet, Michigan and Wisconsin have more political

diversity in rural areas than most states do.

In Wisconsin for

example, some of the most politically conservative areas of the
state are in the wealthy suburbs around Milwaukee.

It’s possible

that the negative sign on % Obama voters in Wisconsin is a proxy
for the rural/urban divide, but that the politics are switched.
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Income – While low incomes has often been cited as a
barrier to energy efficiency at RECs and small MUs, the only
relationship I find between an area’s income level and program
funding is in Wisconsin.

Here it has a positive relationship,

which means the wealthier an area is, the greater its utility
provider invests in energy efficiency.

In their study of EE

programs at Minnesota POUs, Wilson (2008) found low incomes to be
a barrier to program development.

This finding of a positive

relationship in Wisconsin (the state adjacent to Minnesota)
supports that.
% Elect Heat – This variable is another that could be
hypothesized in either direction.

Logically, it makes the most

sense for % elect heat to have a positive relationship.
Historically, heating with electricity has been terribly
inefficient and therefore electrically-heated homes are usually
one of the first targets by energy efficiency programs.

So a

utility with a higher percent of electrically-heated homes in its
area should have more reason to fund a program.
continually comes up significant and positive.

This variable
It is significant

in the both the overall and POU datasets, regardless whether I am
controlling for just states or ownership type as well.

It also

is positive in the state/POU data-subsets for Iowa, Indiana and
Wisconsin.

Only in Michigan did it come up insignificant.

Also

it is often the strongest predictor of the dependent variable for
any of the five independent variables.
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4.3

Overall Findings

1) In 2010, energy efficiency programs were nearly universal
across Iowa, Wisconsin and Michigan.

By 2012, program

coverage in Indiana was substantial.
Of the 336 utilities in those states, only 8 did not operate a
program in 2010.

Of the 178 utilities in Iowa that are asked to

develop programs though not held to minimum standards, only 8
claimed some sort of exception and did not develop a program.
All of the programs in Indiana in 2010 were created voluntarily
since their EERS didn’t go into effect until 2011. Although
outside of the state’s EERS jurisdiction, the majority POUs in
Indiana began operating programs in 2012.

Coverage there now is

much more widespread, likely between 80% and 90%.
2) The state a utility is in is by far the most controlling
factor.
This is due to state policy, regulatory authority and whether
there’s a history and/or culture of energy efficiency and
conservation.

While all four states had enacted EERS by 2010,

Michigan’s policies were implemented in 2009, Iowa in 201 and
Wisconsin and Indiana in 2011.

Iowa has set relatively high

standards for IOUs, while instructing POUs to operate programs
but excluding them from minimum standards.

Michigan’s standard

is less than Iowa’s but applied to all utilities, IOUs and POUs
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alike.

Wisconsin requires IOUs to contribute to a common

program; POUs either contribute to the common program, operate
independent program, or a mix of the two.

Indiana requires all

jurisdictional utilities to reach an energy savings standard
similar to Michigan’s.

Jurisdictional utilities include all IOUs

and the roughly 10% of POUs which haven’t opted out of
jurisdiction.
Within these basic frameworks of policy and regulation, the
state’s history and culture really help drive how much utilities
invest in energy efficiency.

Utilities in Iowa and Wisconsin

have consistently operated energy efficiency programs since the
1980s.

Before a lull from 1996 to 2008, Michigan had a strong

history of energy efficiency programs in the state.

These

histories helped drive energy efficiency irrespective of the
EERS.

While Indiana was one of the first states in this group to

pass an EERS, their energy efficiency program didn’t start until
2011 with some utilities not starting until 2012.

Looking back

to Figure 3.1, one can see that Michigan and Indiana were ranked
similarly before they each passed an EERS.

Even though the

standards are not that dissimilar, by 2012 Michigan had become on
par with Iowa and Wisconsin, while Indiana still languished far
behind.

This is likely due to the history Michigan and their

utilities had in utilizing energy efficiency, as well as popular
support rooted in history of conservation.

74

While this idea has been studied and presented many times,
very few studies have explored a state’s influence at the utility
level.

Through examination of means, medians, standard

deviations and regression analysis, it clear that the state a
utility is in greatly influences energy efficiency program
spending.

In 2010, the average utility in Iowa or Michigan spent

the most (between 0.95% and 0.75% of total revenue), followed by
Wisconsin (between 0.60% and 0.47%) and then Indiana (less the
0.08%).
Reprint of Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue,
Specific to State Data-subsets

State

N

Iowa
Indiana
Michigan
Wisconsin
All

Mean
180
118
58
118
474

0.95%
0.08%
0.85%
0.60%
0.63%

Standard
Deviation
0.91%
0.20%
0.35%
0.40%
0.71%

Median
0.75%
0.00%
0.85%
0.47%
0.47%

Of the three states with widespread program coverage in 2010,
only Michigan set a minimum standard for their POUs. Iowa did not
and Wisconsin’s standard would not begin until 2011. While Iowa
had many small utilities with low spending/revenue data, they
also had many utilities with some of the highest percentages in
the dataset.

This can be seen in the high standard deviation,

almost three times Michigan’s.

Because Michigan sets clearer

standards for its POUs, does that lead to their funding levels
being grouped more closely together?
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Conversely, could Iowa’s

greater freedom with their POUs in setting program goals lead to
a wider dispersion of success?

3) While investor-owned utilities spend more on their energy
efficiency programs as a percent of their total revenue
than do municipal utilities or rural electric cooperatives,
small municipal utilities spend considerably less on
average than large MUs or RECs.
In 2010, IOUs in these four states invested almost 1% of their
total revenue in energy efficiency (Table 4.3).

They were

followed by RECs, large MUs and finally small MUs.

Small MUs,

while they spend the least on average are a diverse group when it
comes to funding levels with 14 of the top 16 utilities in the
overall dataset being small MUs.

Their lower levels of funding

are also evidenced through the regression model.

In Model 2,

small MUs are the constant that the other ownership dummy
variables are being regressed against.

Both RECs and IOUs show

significant and positive relationships when controlling for state
factors and the five independent variables.
Reprint of Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Spending/revenue,
Specific to Ownership Type Data-subsets

Ownership N
IOU
Large MU
Small MU
REC
All

Mean
28
38
292
116
474

0.97%
0.55%
0.59%
0.68%
0.64%

Median
0.94%
0.58%
0.38%
0.55%
0.47%
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Standard
Deviation
0.77%
0.48%
0.77%
0.57%
0.71%

4) The bigger a utility is, the more it invests in its energy
efficiency program.
Through descriptive statistics and regression analysis, total
sales (kWh) continually showed a positive relationship with
spending/revenue.

Yet it is difficult disentangle size from

ownership type, especially when there’s very large amounts of
spending at very large IOUs.

Within only POUs, size did show

positive relationships in Indiana and Iowa.
5) The percent of a utility’s total electrical load that’s
residential potentially has a positive relationship with
spending/revenue.
Often cited as one of the common barriers to energy efficiency at
rural utilities, especially among RECs and MUs, this paper finds
that % res load and spending/revenue potentially have a positive
relationship.

First, in a comparison of means (Table 4.6) and

within regression Model 1, % res load suggests a positive
relationship.

While it’s possible this is the case, it more

likely that the relationship is better explain by RECs spending
more than small MUs.

And that RECs have a much greater share of

residential load than small MUs.

Because when ownership types

are controlled for % res load is no longer significant.

77

6) As a general rule, a liberal political persuasion at the
local level does not increase investments in energy
efficiency programs.
While the % Obama voters does show a positive relationship when
the regression model is applied to Michigan, it also shows a
negative relationship when Model 3 is applied to the Wisconsin
data-subset.

Neither in the overall dataset nor the POU dataset,

does % Obama voters reach a level of significance.

This is the

case when controlling for state and ownership effects.

Since the

state capitol is where much of the energy efficiency policy takes
place, the political make-up of the legislature may be a better
predictor of energy efficiency than the political make-up of the
population.
7) Areas with larger shares of houses heated with electricity,
invest more in energy efficiency programs.
This finding supports the idea that energy efficiency
programs target homes that are electrically-heated.

It makes

sense that utilities that serve communities with higher shares of
electrically-heated homes would be more interested in pursuing
energy efficiency and delivering program services.

The variable

was found to be significant and positive both in the overall and
POU datasets, as well as in Iowa, Indiana and Wisconsin.
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CHAPTER 5
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
One of the goals of this research was to evaluate how
ownership type at an electric utility affected the development
and operation of an energy efficiency program.

I had thought if

I created a dataset of all the utilities within a sample of
states, I could take the findings and apply them more broadly to
MUs, RECs and IOUs all across the country.

By selecting four

states that controlled for many factors (climate, culture, etc.),
it was thought that state policy and regulation would be the main
controlling factors; that states could be categorized as: no
energy efficiency regulation, only regulation of IOUs, or
regulation of all utilities.
But what I found was that even in a sample of four states I
found a good deal of variety in state policy and regulation.
Likewise I learned that there’s more to the state factor than
just policy.

A state’s history of energy efficiency utilization

and attitude towards conservation are likely factors as well.
The state-level influence appears to not only be the strongest
factor in energy efficiency program funding, but also something
extremely distinct to each state.
Many of the findings likely would apply to nearby states in
the Midwest, but that applicability grows thin as one moves to
other regions of the country.

For one, the disparity in wealth
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between rural and metro areas in the Midwest is not as stark as
it is in the South.

While this study didn’t find that income

level was a reliable predictor of energy efficiency spending
(outside of Wisconsin), in other regions with a poorer rural
population that might not be the case.
While I made all reasonable attempts to create a uniform
dataset, it is far from perfect.

Each state utilizes different

systems and templates that utilities use to submit energy
efficiency program data.

Even within states numerous forms and

procedures exist for utilities of different ownership types and
size.

Sometime spending data is simply one line item in a larger

budget, sometimes the entire report is about energy efficiency
and I had to add up individual line items.

Any future attempts

to create a dataset of EE program spending or energy savings
should take these cautions into account.
Likewise, the method of attaching socio-demographic and
economic variables to utility service areas was far from perfect.
In other areas of the country where there’s more uniformity in a
utility provider across a town or county, attaching variables
would be a smoother process.

Yet the states in this study have

extremely complicated service areas that simply do not match any
geographic designation of the census bureau.
As part of the research process, I intentionally set the
issue of scale aside in order to focus on small and very small
publicly-owned utilities.

Yet if the greater goal is to reduce
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energy use, it makes sense that policymakers focus first on the
largest utilities.

To help put this thesis in perspective, it’s

necessary to address the issue of scale.
In Iowa for example, the two large IOUs distribute 37 times
as much energy as the smallest 100 utilities combined.

From a

policy standpoint, does it make sense to spend time and resources
on getting small utilities to start programs when the
contribution of these utilities to total energy use is
comparatively insignificant?

A modest program at a large utility

can save more energy than many robust programs at small
utilities.
In this thesis I have normalized the size of utilities by
their total revenue, but can energy efficiency programs at very
large and very small utilities even be compared via a monetary
normalization?

Is an investment of $40,000 by a utility with

1,000 customers as relatively effective as an investment of $40
million by a utility with one million customers? What about
$4,000 for 100 customers?

At each of these vastly different

scales, I briefly address what specific activities constitute an
energy efficiency program?
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shed light on these questions.

Table

5.1 presents five different scales of program spending in Iowa.
First are the two IOUs who spend in the tens of millions of
dollars, then the three highest spending POUs who spend in the
hundreds of thousands, then three POUs in the tens of thousands,
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then four MUs who spend just over 10,000, followed by three of
the smallest programs in Iowa.

Table 5.1 also shows quick

comparisons of program offerings, while Table 5.2 gives more
detail about numbers of participants and total funding in
specific program categories.

EE Spending as %
of Revenue

Total Customers

Appliance/Heating/
Cooling Rebates

$42,252,259

3.63%

637,604

X

X

X

X

IOU

2

$28,567,395

2.17%

483,196

X

X

X

X

REC

3

$922,204

2.16%

24,685

X

X

X

X

REC

4

$639,909

1.81%

9,477

X

X

X

X

MU-L

5

$635,972

1.74%

17,911

X

X

X

X

REC

41

$78,729

1.50%

1,933

X

X

Clarke EC

REC

42

$76,289

0.70%

5,229

X

X

Akron
Farnhamvil
le

MU-S

45

$54,460

4.14%

836

X

X

MU-S

84

$13,035

3.38%

257

X

X

Alta
Forest
City

MU-S

86

$12,694

0.93%

965

X

X

MU-S

87

$12,055

0.23%

1,969

X

X

Aurelia
Pleasant
Hill
Community
Line

MU-S

88

$11,920

1.67%

521

X

X

169

$150

0.04%

103

REC

X

Alta Vista MU-S 170
$143
0.08%
197
Marathon
MU-S 172
$100
0.05%
223
X
Source: Energy efficiency program reports from Iowa PUB website
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Weatherization
Program
Significant NonRes. Program(s)

Total EE Spending

1

MidAmerica
n Energy
Interstate
P&L
Linn
County REC
North West
REC
Cedar
Falls
Franklin
REC

Lighting
Incentives

EE Spending Rank

IOU

Utility

Ownership Type

Table 5.1: Scale and Types of Energy Efficiency Programs at Utilities
in Iowa

X

Generally, the smaller programs tend to just offer lighting
incentives (i.e. free CFLs) and rebates for new space
heating/cooling systems, appliances and domestic hot water
systems.

These rebates can be as low as $15 for a ventilation

fan or as high as $6,500 for a heat pump.

Considering that lack

of staff capacity is a common barrier to program development at
small utilities, it makes sense that small utilities would focus
their resources on less complicated programs like offering
rebates.
As programs grow in size the variety grows as well. Both
North West REC and Cedar Falls MU offer weatherization programs,
as well as commercial/industrial programs.

Both of these types

of programs, especially when they offer energy audits and/or
financing options tend to be more complicated and can take more
staff to manage.

Weatherization programs not only require

knowledgeable staff at the utility, but also local and
experienced energy efficiency contractors to carry out the work.
Industrial, commercial and agricultural programs can require
greater expertise as well.

While energy efficient lighting

upgrades in a single family house are usually as simple as
changing a light bulb, large stores, factories and other
facilities can have more complicated systems that require more
knowledge and skill in order to upgrade.
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Table 5.2: Energy Efficiency Program Specifics and the Scale of
Spending at Utilities in Iowa
Programs/Incentives Offered – Total participants served /
type of program (total $ spent) – (RES: Residential, NON-RES:
Utility
Non-Residential)
RES: 11,661 HVAC ($2.2 Mil), 1 Mil Lighting ($1.4 Mil),
25,793 Energy Star Appliances ($1.2 Mil), 4,998
Weatherization ($723,429), 6,091 New Construction ($2.1
Mil), 45,276; NON-RES: 62,173 Lighting ($1.2 Mil), 2,038
Custom Program ($1.1 Mil), 22,588 Small Commercial Program
($1.2 Mil), 13,980 Energy Analysis Program ($3.2 Mil), 527
MidAmeric Comm New Const ($5.9 Mil); also appliance recycling,
an Energy agriculture, & multi-family programs
RES: Heating/cooling, appliance rebates ($8.1 Mil), Energy
Audits/Weatherization ($1.3 Mil), Appliance Recycling ($1.6
Mil); NON-RES: Heating/Cooling/Appliance Rebates ($4.5 Mil),
Custom Program ($6.3 Mil), Comm New Const ($3.5 Mil) and
Intersta
Multi-family, New Home Const, Agriculture, and Performance
te P&L
Contracting Programs
Linn
RES: 143 Geothermal HP ($299,140), 346 DHW ($79,588), 1,485
County
Energy Star Appliances ($102,387), other lighting,
REC
heating/cooling, DHW
RES 58 Geothermal HP ($160,727), 105 Air Source HP
($91,169), 180 DHW ($63,008), 95 Weatherization ($44,081),
other appliances, heating/cooling, lighting; NON-RES: 5
North
custom industrial program ($162,384), other lighting,
West REC
heating/cooling
Offers Energy Audits to houses at least 10 years old where
CFLs, low-flow showerheads and other small measures are
installed. Aside from various heating/cooling and appliance
Cedar
rebates, the utility offers rebates on weatherization
Falls
measures following the audit
RES: 12 Geothermal HP ($18,280), 18 Air Source HP ($11,490),
Franklin
33 DHW ($13,605), other lighting, appliance,
REC
heating/cooling, DHW incentives,
RES: 21 Geothermal Heat Pump ($30,892), 13 Air Source Heat
Clarke
Pump ($8,423), 3,218 Lighting ($5,471), other
EC
heating/cooling, DHW, Energy Star Appliances
RES: 9 Gas Furnace/Boiler Incentives ($45K), 17 Elect DHW
Akron
heaters ($3,400), 3 new home construction ($6,000)
Farnhamv
ille
RES: 400 Lighting ($0), 2 Res Heat Pumps ($13,035)
RES: 702 Lighting Incentives ($1,953), 7 Res Heat Pumps
Alta
($2,338), 1 Ventilation Fan ($15), 24 Electric DHW ($7,928)
RES: 864 Lighting ($1,284), 40 Energy Star Appliances
Forest
($2,863), 15 Appliance Recycling ($363), 16 Air Cond
City
($1,600), 6 Vent. Fans ($60), NON-RES: 112 Lighting ($5,886)
RES: 440 Lighting ($1,320), 20 Energy Star Appliances
($650), 1 Air Cond ($100), 5 Res Heat Pumps ($8,400), 8
Aurelia
Electric DHW ($1,600)
Pleasant
Hill
CFL bulbs handed out to members who attended Annual Meeting
Alta
Management costs for Low-Income program likely funded from
Vista
different source?
Marathon
2 Energy Star Appliances ($100)
Source: Energy efficiency program reports from Iowa PUB website
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At the top of Table 5.1 are the two large IOUs in Iowa.
While MidAmerican Energy and Interstate P&L distribute about 75%
of the energy in the state, they account for 86% of the total
spending on energy efficiency programs in the state.

Because

they proportionally spend more than their smaller counterparts,
it’s difficult to parse out how much of their increased program
options are due to more relative spending or more absolute
spending.

While the program offerings at the IOUs and large POUs

may seem similar in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 shows the breadth and
budgets of specific programs.

The IOUs do have more spending in

common programs like rebates and lighting as would be expected.
However these common programs that tend to dominate the portfolio
of EE programs at small utilities tend to be a small percentage.
Less than 15% of MidAmerican Energy’s total spending is on
residential rebates and lighting.

The two RECs with the largest

budgets, Linn County and North West, spend between 60% and 75% on
residential rebates and lighting. And aside from Forest City MU
(which offered a commercial lighting program), all the other POUs
in Table 4.13 spent their entire budget on residential rebates
and lighting.
One of the advantages of scale appears to be that EE
programs can increase in variety as well as simply offer more of
the same.

This short survey shows that small EE programs tend to

only offer rebates and lighting upgrades.

For the small

utilities who have larger spending as a % of revenue
(Farnhamville and Akron), their relatively large spending is
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simple due to offering larger incentives and allowing more
participants.

Farnhamville’s entire EE program in 2010 was two

residential heating pump rebates, in operation very similar to
Marathon’s which also offered two rebates (for efficient
appliances).

The difference was that Marathon’s rebate was worth

$50 each, while Farnhamville offered over $6,500.

Likewise,

Akron offered 9 furnace/boiler rebates each worth $5,000.

This

encompassed 83% of their total budget.
As the program’s budget expands the program variety also
expands.

Once programs reach budgets into the hundreds of

thousands, they begin regularly incorporating weatherization and
expanding incentives to commercial, industrial and agricultural
customers. Looking at the large IOUs and their budgets in the
tens of millions, the program variety expands even more.

Aside

from offering the same package as the large RECs and MUs, the
IOUs offer many other specialized programs that can target
niches.

They can divide up their commercial program to serve

large, small and new construction commercial all separately.
MidAmerican Energy even has an Energy Analysis program which
offers advanced energy audits to large commercial/industrial
customers.
Aside from a similarly designed study that created a better
dataset through a more defined and exhaustive collection of
program data or more sophisticated calculation of the independent
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variables, the best next steps for future research would be to
explore these states in greater detail.
Iowa, with its large number of utilities, robust programs
and detailed reporting mechanisms offers a great laboratory to
explore energy efficiency programs in more detail.

As the short

survey above explained, it’s possible to get program spending and
energy savings data for very specific efficiency measures.

It

would be interesting to explore which types of measures help
utilities most effectively reach their energy savings goals.
Indiana is interesting because of the relatively strong EE
program developed voluntarily by many of the RECs in 2009.
Additionally, almost all of the RECs and most of the MUs
voluntarily joined Energizing Indiana, the state-branded program
in 2012.

Since Hoosier Energy (the cooperative of 17 RECs with

an EE program in 2009), started their energy efficiency program
independent of state policy, it would be interesting to find out
how joining the state program, Energizing Indiana, has affected
their program.
While Michigan does have savings minimums and spending caps
on all its utilities which constrict variability, they do exhibit
an interesting mix of program management options.

There are

three common programs in Michigan and a number of utilities who
operate independent programs.

Since Michigan’s utilities are

split somewhat evenly between the four options, it would be
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interesting to explore the relative success of each program
versus the utilities that operate programs independently.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The thing that stands out most in this study is the quickly
evolving nature of the energy efficiency industry.
evaluated the year 2010.

This research

If one were to apply the same method to

2012 data spending/revenue results would likely be greater; 2008
data on the other hand, the results would likely much less.
Indiana is probably the best example of this.

For a long

time the state has been in the lower tiers of states when it
comes to energy efficiency.

While it took a year or two longer

than expected to get fully operation, their common program
Energizing Indiana now has a substantial membership among POUs.
Even though they’re exempted from the minimum standards set forth
in the state’s EERS, nearly every REC and most MUs have joined
the state program anyway.

These voluntary actions towards energy

efficiency by the state’s POUs even precede the state’s EERS and
Energizing Indiana.

In 2009, Hoosier Energy, a G&T Cooperative

made up of 17 RECs, created an energy efficiency program of their
own.

While the voluntary programs at the state’s IOUs spent an

average of 0.12% of their total revenue on energy efficiency
programs, the average for the 17 RECs was 0.51%, over four times
as much.
This is similar to Iowa where even though POUs are exempted
from the minimum standards, over 90% of them developed energy
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efficiency programs; with some of them investing a higher
percentage of their total revenue than the state’s large IOUs.
Michigan and Wisconsin have found success as well with every
utility in each state investing in a consumer energy efficiency
program.
These are all positive developments.

In Wisconsin and

Michigan, where POUs are given minimum energy saving or program
spending standards, every utility invests in an energy efficiency
program.

In Iowa and Indiana, where POUs are excluded from the

minimum standards (though encouraged to develop a program),
nearly every utility invests in an energy efficiency program.
The main thread running through these four states is that a state
energy efficiency policy has been established.

Even where POUs

are exempted from the regulation, they still seem to be investing
in energy efficiency.
For policymakers looking to increase the adoption of energy
efficiency in their communities one of the lessons in this thesis
is that flexibility in policy design can be a good thing.
EERS is a good example.

Iowa’s

Although the relatively strong energy

saving standard does not apply to POUs the state does not exempt
POUs from the EERS entirely.

They require POUs to establish

energy efficiency programs, but allow each POU to set their own
goals, however ambitious or modest they may be.

This has led to

a wide variety of programs types and spending levels.

While

there are a number of RECs and MUs in Iowa that have small
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programs, there are many POUs in Iowa that voluntarily spend more
on energy efficiency than any POUs in Michigan, even though the
latter are not exempt from their state energy efficiency
standards.

It’s the flexibility in Iowa’s policy that allows for

some publicly-owned utilities to develop stronger energy
efficiency programs than they might have if they were given
strict minimum standards.
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